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Gwendolyn Brooks’s “The Children of the Poor” is a meditation on parenthood 
in times of hardship, with a particular focus on the impact of poverty and social 
injustice. The title of this Comment comes from the second sonnet of Brooks’s tripar-
tite poem: “What shall I give my children? who are poor, / Who are adjudged the 
leastwise of the land.” In the poem, Brooks asks an immediate question: How will 
she respond to her children’s requests right now for material goods and acceptance 
that she cannot give them? Unable to fulfill those needs, the mother in the poem 
instructs her children in their reality, providing lessons that will hopefully support 
them throughout their lives. This is the much larger question for parents, who worry 
not just for their children’s present but also for their future. Echoing Brooks’s sim-
ultaneous focus on material needs and emotional resilience, this Comment is about 
homeownership—the cornerstone of the American Dream and an “essential” for an-
yone hoping to pass on generational wealth to their children. 
Historically, there can be no doubt that homeownership has allowed a great 
many Americans, primarily White Americans, to build wealth and provide their 
children with financial stability. For those Americans able to become homeowners, 
especially those who did so in the mid-twentieth century, the promises of homeown-
ership have been fulfilled. But for those cut out of the primary homeownership mar-
ket, especially Black Americans, those promises have largely proved empty. In fact, 
the financing devices available to low-income and minority communities have had 
significant adverse effects on those communities and their ability to pass on any kind 
of wealth or prosperity to their children. This Comment explores the installment 
land contract (ILC), one financing device that has been used in lieu of a mortgage 
for those who cannot qualify for traditional mortgage financing. 
The ILC was especially prominent during the mid-twentieth century in Black 
communities shut out of the mortgage market by the Federal Housing Administra-
tion. Since 2008, the ILC has again become popular: increased regulation of the 
mortgage market has made it more difficult for low-income homebuyers to get mort-
gages, but the underlying desire to participate in the American Dream has not 
changed. This Comment looks at the history of the ILC and, using that as a 
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backdrop, explores the best way to take advantage of the financing device while still 
protecting potential buyers from the worst of its associated risks. To that end, this 
Comment concludes that current regulation is inadequate to appropriately deal with 
the risks of the ILC. This Comment proposes the adoption of three protective 
measures: (1) imposing mandatory purchase counseling, (2) creating venue require-
ments that prohibit eviction courts from hearing ILC cases, and (3) making per se 
unconscionable all ILCs that include both an “as is” deed and a forfeiture clause. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A white picket fence. A house in the suburbs. 2.5 kids. There 
may be nothing more central to the modern conception of the 
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American Dream1 than homeownership.2 John Locke theorized 
that everyone has the right to life, liberty, and property,3 and the 
protection of those rights is at the core of the US Constitution.4 
The ability to own a home is considered a fundamental part of 
being American—not merely for the psychological benefits of a 
stable housing situation but also as a long-term investment for 
wealth building.5 The pursuit of that dream, and the need to pre-
sent that dream as universally attainable, has justified various 
policies that ultimately strip wealth from low-income and minor-
ity neighborhoods.6 In particular, the purported benefits of home-
ownership have justified loose regulation of predatory contracts 
that offer low-income households an elusive promise of homeown-
ership while extracting profit from those same households. One 
alternative form of financing for homeownership is the installment 
land contract, a popular financing tool for low-income homeowners 
which has a long history of predation, especially in low-income and 
minority communities. This Comment explores the historical and 
current uses of the installment land contract and the best ways 
to effectively protect buyers from this contract’s most predatory 
qualities. 
This Comment uses the term “installment land contract,” or 
ILC, but the terminology varies across states.7 The ILC is what is 
 
 1 It is a relatively modern phenomenon to conflate the American Dream and material 
success, but there is no doubt that at this time homeownership is generally considered 
part of the American Dream. See Robert J. Shiller, The Transformation of the ‘American 
Dream’ (NY Times, Aug 4, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/53WT-4T6B. 
 2 See Michael Dolan, How Did the White Picket Fence Become a Symbol of the Sub-
urbs? (Smithsonian, Apr 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/MGZ9-UC73. 
 3 Locke’s Political Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Jan 11, 2016), 
archived at https://perma.cc/2SU3-DH58. 
 4 US Const Amend V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”); US Const Amend XIV, § 1. James Madison, in his essay on 
property, stated, “Government is instituted to protect property of every sort.” James Mad-
ison, Property (originally published 1792), in Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds, 1 
The Founders’ Constitution (Chicago 1986), archived at https://perma.cc/BL8Q-TTLU. 
 5 The Editorial Board, Homeownership and Wealth Creation (NY Times, Nov 29, 
2014), archived at https://perma.cc/8QV4-6Y6N. 
 6 Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations (The Atlantic, June 2014), archived at 
https://perma.cc/Y8WL-2H7F. See also Christopher E. Herbert, Daniel T. McCue, and Ro-
cio Sanchez-Moyano, Is Homeownership Still an Effective Means of Building Wealth for 
Low-Income and Minority Households? (Was It Ever?) *9–13 (Joint Center for Housing 
Studies of Harvard University, Sept 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/6QE5-Q66Z. 
 7 This Comment uses the term “ILC” because it is the term that appears most often 
in scholarly literature, court cases, and legislation. However, for many ILC buyers, the 
precise term used by the state is beside the point and any solutions directed toward deal-
ing with ILC abuses should focus on how the contract functions, not on what label is used. 
This is most obviously true for labels like “ILC,” “contract for deed,” “bond for deed,” “real 
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colloquially known as a rent-to-own8 housing contract; that is, a 
seller-financed agreement wherein the buyer pays a relatively 
small down payment and then pays off the remainder of the pur-
chase price plus interest in installments, while the seller retains 
title until the loan is repaid in full.9 The many terms used to refer 
to the ILC rarely reflect a substantive legal difference. However, 
there are two types of contracts which sometimes fall under the 
umbrella of rent-to-own contracts and may look like ILCs but in-
clude legal provisions that make them functionally distinct from 
the ILC. While the terminology varies here as well, I refer to these 
contracts as “lease-purchase” and “lease-option” contracts. A lease-
option contract functions as a typical lease with an option to buy 
the property at the end of a period of years—a lease-purchase con-
tract functions similarly, but requires the buyer to purchase after 
the lease term expires.10 Under these agreements, the tenant-
buyer should receive all attendant landlord-tenant protections 
during the period of the lease.11 However, some contracts labeled 
as lease-purchase are functionally indistinguishable from the typ-
ical understanding of an ILC.12 The scope of this Comment, as well 
as relevant legislation, should be interpreted to extend to agree-
ments that function as ILCs—no matter what label is used.13 
 
estate contract,” “land contract,” and “rent-to-own”—but also for terms like “lease-option” 
or “lease-purchase.” 
 8 See, for example, Matthew Goldstein, New York State Officials Sue ‘Predatory’ Rent-
to-Own Home Seller (NY Times, Aug 1, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/ZXD2-YW8E. 
 9 James E. Larsen, Installment Land Contracts, Single-Family Houses and Bar-
gaining Power, 9 Intl J Housing Mkts & Analysis 340, 341 (2016). 
 10 Jean Folger, Rent-to-Own Homes: How the Process Works (Investopedia, July 8, 
2019), archived at https://perma.cc/8ED5-VWR6. 
 11 Jeremiah Battle Jr, Sarah Mancini, Margot Saunders, and Odette Williamson, 
Toxic Transactions: How Land Installment Contracts Once Again Threaten Communities 
of Color *9 (National Consumer Law Center, July 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
8SAH-KUY5. These authors use the term “lease-purchase” to refer to what I’ve defined as 
lease-option contracts and do not distinguish between the two. I distinguish here between 
the two types of contracts as an attempt to clarify when a distinction in terminology might 
indicate a functional legal difference, but these terms are not consistent across states or 
even necessarily across sellers within a state. 
 12 Id. 
 13 For a defense of the use of a functional-equivalence test in this context, albeit for 
treating certain ILCs as leases, see Eric T. Freyfogle, The Installment Land Contract as 
Lease: Habitability Protections and the Low-Income Purchaser, 62 NYU L Rev 293, 310–
19 (1987). Professor Eric T. Freyfogle’s argument is a necessary corollary to this Comment: 
if courts do not view the agreement in question as an ILC protected by the necessary stat-
utes, buyers should receive the protections of landlord-tenant law, including the implied 
warranty of habitability. See id. But see generally Nicole Summers, The Limits of Good 
Law: A Study of Housing Court Outcomes, 87 U Chi L Rev 145 (2020) (arguing based on 
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ILCs are unique agreements for those seeking stable housing. 
Unlike mortgages, as buyers pay installments, they do not be-
come part owners of the property—that is, they do not build eq-
uity in their home. Unlike leases, the sellers have no duty to pro-
vide habitable housing and no duty to make repairs while the 
buyers live there. Thus, if buyers default, sellers can remove them 
from the home, keep all the payments that have been made, and 
reap the benefits of any repairs made while the buyers lived there. 
This Comment argues that the interplay of “as is” deeds and 
forfeiture clauses is the core of what makes the ILC intolerable as 
a financing tool, and explains that this interplay should shape 
how legislatures regulate ILCs.14 Part I provides a brief introduc-
tion to the ILC and its most pertinent characteristics. Part II ex-
plores the history of the ILC, focusing specifically on its use in 
majority Black neighborhoods in Chicago, Illinois, during the 
1950s and ’60s. I focus on the history in Chicago for two reasons: 
(1) the largest litigation effort challenging the use of the ILC was 
based in Chicago; and (2) Illinois historically had some of the 
weakest ILC protections in the country, but in 2018 implemented 
a new statute strengthening protections for ILC buyers. 
Part III surveys recent legislation reforming ILCs in the wake 
of their resurgence in popularity after the 2008 subprime mort-
gage crisis. Part III also explores the effect of aggressive regula-
tion on the ILC market in Texas, where the strongest regulations 
have been in place since 2000. Part IV explores why these 
measures either have failed or are likely to fail, with a focus on 
the exploitative nature of the ILC market. Finally, Part V sug-
gests that legislatures and courts should seek to regulate the ILC 
by: (1) requiring sellers to provide prepurchase counseling in the 
mold of the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 199415 
(HOEPA); (2) mandating that ILC cases are heard in the same 
courts that typically hear mortgage cases, not the courts that typ-
ically hear eviction cases; and (3) finding per se unconscionable 
any ILC that includes both a forfeiture clause and sells the prop-
erty “as is.” Ideally, these actions would be taken in conjunction 
 
empirical evidence that the implied warranty of habitability has failed to offer meaningful 
protections to tenants). 
 14 Since ILC purchasers tend to be low income, this Comment accepts that these con-
tracts are riskier for sellers and that sellers may therefore apply much higher interest 
rates. 
 15 Pub L No 103-325, 108 Stat 2190, codified in various sections of Title 15. 
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with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), ensur-
ing that buyers in all states receive appropriate protection. 
I.  BACKGROUND ON THE ILC 
Most ILCs share certain characteristics. Perhaps the defining 
characteristic of the ILC is that, unlike a traditional mortgage, 
buyers do not build equity in the house over time. The inability to 
build equity, and thus an ownership interest, creates a large risk 
for buyers—who are at risk of simultaneously losing both their 
housing and any investment they have attempted to make in the 
property. ILCs generally require a lower down payment than a 
traditional mortgage.16 To speed up the timeline of the loan, it is 
typically partially amortizing17 with a balloon payment18 complet-
ing loan repayment.19 Interest rates on ILCs are typically sub-
stantially higher than interest rates on traditional loans; one 
study of ILCs in Montgomery County, Ohio, found that of 1,427 
ILCs examined, 1,077 had “above-market” interest rates as com-
pared to the average Federal Housing Administration–insured 
loan offered during the same period.20 The Chicago Reader re-
cently published a study showing that the three big ILC lenders 
selling in Chicago in the post–Great Recession era offer contracts 
with interest rates between 8 and 10 percent.21 
However, one of the key difficulties with the ILC is that, as a 
creature of state law, it is treated disparately across the United 
States. This can be seen just in the terminology that is used. 
States variously refer to ILCs as bonds for title,22 real estate con-
tracts,23 bonds for deed,24 land installment contracts,25 contracts 
 
 16 Larsen, 9 Intl J Housing Mkts & Analysis at 341 (cited in note 9). 
 17 Black’s Law Dictionary 36 (West 3d Pocket Ed 2006) (defining “amortization” as 
“[t]he act or result of gradually extinguishing a debt . . . by contributing payments of prin-
cipal each time a periodic interest payment is due”). 
 18 Id at 528 (defining a “balloon payment” as “[a] final loan payment that is [usually] 
much larger than the preceding regular payments and that discharges the principal bal-
ance of the loan”). 
 19 Larsen, 9 Intl J Housing Mkts & Analysis at 341 (cited in note 9). 
 20 Id at 343–44. 
 21 Rebecca Burns, The Infamous Practice of Contract Selling Is Back in Chicago (Chi 
Reader, Mar 1, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/NUZ9-E6NN. The three companies ex-
amined by Burns were Harbour Portfolio Advisors, Vision Property Management, and Bat-
tery Point Financial. 
 22 See Gay v Tompkins, 385 S2d 973, 977 (Ala 1980); Southern Land & Cattle Co v 
Simmons, 415 SE2d 329, 329–30 (Ga App 1992). 
 23 See Iowa Code § 656.1 et seq. 
 24 See La Rev Stat Ann § 2941 et seq; 14 Me Rev Stat Ann § 6203-F. 
 25 See 33 Me Rev Stat Ann §§ 481–82; Md Real Prop Code Ann § 10-101 et seq. 
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for deed,26 and executory contracts.27 Some sources refer to them 
simply as land contracts28 or real estate contracts.29 A buyer might 
say they have entered into a rent-to-own agreement, though such 
terminology rarely appears in statutes or court cases.30 
The different names for the ILC reflect that it is treated dras-
tically different from state to state. For example, Oklahoma has 
treated the ILC as a mortgage since 1976.31 At the time of writing, 
Oklahoma is the only state that has legislatively decided to treat 
the ILC as a mortgage—the solution recommended by the Third 
Restatement of Property.32 Treating the ILC as a mortgage pro-
vides more stringent protections for buyers, but also makes the 
financing device indistinguishable from others. Thus, it decreases 
the likelihood that sellers will offer these contracts. 
A number of state courts have exhibited some reluctance to 
fully enforce the harshest terms of ILCs, particularly with regard 
to the fact that buyers do not build equity in the property. Thus, 
those courts have attempted to apply equitable principles of laws, 
meaning that they have attempted to determine what the most 
“fair” result would be by weighing the buyer’s interest in the prop-
erty and payments made against the seller’s interest in the prop-
erty and payments not yet made. Such a consideration may 
 
 26 See Minn Stat Ann § 559.202; Mont Code Ann § 70-20-115; NC Gen Stat Ann 
§ 47H; 16 Okla Stat Ann § 11A. 
 27 See SD Cod Laws § 21-50; Tex Prop Code Ann § 5.062; Va Code Ann § 55.1-3000. 
 28 See, for example, N. William Hines, Forfeiture of Installment Land Contracts, 12 
U Kan L Rev 475, 476 (1964). 
 29 See generally, for example, Kathryn Stryker, Note, Vendor and Purchaser—Real 
Estate Contracts—The Future of the Real Estate Contract in New Mexico: Huckins v. Rit-
ter, 14 NM L Rev 531 (1984). 
 30 Journalists commonly refer to Vision Property Management as a rent-to-own op-
erator. See, for example, Goldstein, New York State Officials Sue ‘Predatory’ Rent-to-Own 
Home Seller (cited in note 8); Ben Lane, Rent-to-Own Operator Vision Property Manage-
ment Shut Down in Wisconsin (HousingWire, Oct 11, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
WAX3-QFU8. 
 31 16 Okla Stat Ann § 11A (“All contracts for deed for purchase and sale of real prop-
erty . . . shall to that extent be deemed and held mortgages, and shall be subject to the 
same rules of foreclosure and to the same regulations, restraints and forms as are pre-
scribed in relation to mortgages.”). 
 32 Restatement (Third) of Property § 3.4 (1997) (arguing that “[t]he answer to the 
credit problem lies not in perpetuating an unpredictable and problematic financing device 
that often falls far short of being efficient and inexpensive,” but instead in treating all real 
estate security transactions as mortgages). The Restatement lists a number of states 
which have case law suggesting that courts will treat ILCs as mortgages. Such judicial 
doctrines are of dubious assistance to buyers, given the inconsistency with which these 
protections are applied. See Lisa A. Danielson, Note, Installment Land Contracts: The Il-
linois Experience and the Difficulties of Incremental Judicial Reform, 1986 U Ill L Rev 91, 
101–09. 
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include an examination of whether the buyer has made signifi-
cant repairs, how many payments have been made, and whether 
the default was willful on the part of the buyer.33 Other states, 
including Illinois before its 2018 legislation,34 have enforced ILCs 
even where buyers made equitable arguments to keep their hous-
ing.35 When states have legislatively regulated ILCs, they have 
typically used some combination of mandatory disclosures, re-
cording requirements, and a statutory equitable right of redemp-
tion. These approaches are surveyed thoroughly in Part III. 
For the purposes of this Comment, the two most important 
characteristics of a typical ILC are the requirement to purchase 
the property “as is,” which is a contractual requirement that buy-
ers purchase the property in its existing condition with no further 
repairs by the seller,36 and the infamous forfeiture clause, which 
allows sellers to take back the property through the eviction pro-
cess and retain all the payments already made on the home.37 The 
Chicago Reader found that all three big companies currently sell-
ing ILCs in Chicago “require customers to purchase properties ‘as 
is’ and make all repairs in addition to paying property taxes and 
home owner’s insurance.”38 The combination of these clauses 
forms the core of the concern about the predatory nature of ILCs, 
which “combine[ ] all the responsibilities of homeownership with 
 
 33 See Jenkins v Wise, 574 P2d 1337, 1341 (Hawaii 1978) (“[W]here the vendee’s 
breach has not been due to gross negligence, or to deliberate or bad-faith conduct on his 
part, and the vendor can reasonably and adequately be compensated for his injury, courts 
in equity will generally grant relief against forfeiture and decree specific performance.”). 
See also, for example, Curry v Tucker, 616 P2d 8, 13 (Alaska 1980); Skendzel v Marshall, 
301 NE2d 641, 644–46 (Ind 1973); Stoltz v Grimm, 689 P2d 927, 929–30 (Nev 1984); 
McLacklan v Thompson, 122 Misc 2d 239, 241–42 (NY Sup 1983). For other cases applying 
these principles, see Lewis v Premium Investment Corp, 568 SE2d 361, 364 (SC 2002). 
 34 See Part III. 
 35 See, for example, Eade v Brownlee, 193 NE2d 786, 789 (Ill 1963) (“[I]t was the 
intention of the parties that no equitable conversion would be made and that the purchaser 
would take no title in the premises until delivery of deed or full payment.”). 
 36 Black’s Law Dictionary (West 11th ed 2019) (defining “as is” and explaining that 
“[g]enerally, a sale of property ‘as is’ means that the property is sold in its existing condi-
tion, and use of the phrase as is relieves the seller from liability for defects in that condi-
tion”) (emphasis in original). 
 37 Black’s Law Dictionary 297 (West 3d Pocket Ed 2006) (defining “forfeiture clause” 
as “[a] contractual provision stating that, under certain circumstances, one party must 
forfeit something to the other”). 
 38 Burns, The Infamous Practice of Contract Selling (cited in note 21). 
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all the disadvantages of renting—while offering the benefits of 
neither.”39 
The forfeiture clause is, arguably, the defining feature of an 
ILC, generating both the most litigation and the most scholarly 
debate.40 This clause “allows the seller to declare the contract ter-
minated, retain all payments as liquidated damages, and retake 
possession of the premises without legal process upon the buyer’s 
default.”41 As harsh as the clause appears—and often is in prac-
tice—scholars have long defended it as the primary reason sellers 
continue to enter into these kinds of contracts.42 Still, recognizing 
the risk of serious inequity, especially if a buyer has paid off a 
good portion of the total price, legislatures and courts have 
worked to limit the reach of the forfeiture clause. Some statutes 
implement grace periods, most courts tend to weigh the equities 
before strictly enforcing forfeiture, and some states have elimi-
nated the remedy entirely or for residential properties.43 With this 
legal background in mind, Part II explores the history of the ILC 
in practice, focusing on its use in minority neighborhoods. 
II.  HISTORY OF THE ILC 
Focusing on the Midwest, and Chicago specifically, this Part 
explores the history of the ILC. Part II.A examines how this his-
tory intersects with the civil rights movement and historical hous-
ing discrimination against Black Americans.44 As discussed in 
 
 39 Coates, The Case for Reparations (cited in note 6). The combination of clauses 
means that ILC buyers must pay for repairs, pay property taxes and insurance, and pay 
the seller on time. Failure to pay the seller on time triggers the forfeiture clause. 
 40 See Stacy Purcell, The Current Predatory Nature of Land Contracts and How to 
Implement Reforms, 93 Notre Dame L Rev 1771, 1772 n 14 (2018) (collecting sources). 
 41 Juliet M. Moringiello, A Mortgage by Any Other Name: A Plea for the Uniform 
Treatment of Installment Land Contracts and Mortgages Under the Bankruptcy Code, 100 
Dickinson L Rev 733, 740 (1996). 
 42 See id at 741. See also Hines, 12 U Kan L Rev at 481 (cited in note 28) (arguing 
that “[i]f we did not have the installment land contract, we would very likely have to invent 
it”); Thomas Leo McKeirnan, Preserving Real Estate Contract Financing in Washington: 
Resisting the Pressure to Eliminate Forfeiture, 70 Wash L Rev 227, 246 (1995); Eric T. 
Freyfogle, Vagueness and the Rule of Law: Reconsidering Installment Land Contract For-
feitures, 1988 Duke L J 609, 649–50 (noting that “foreclosure largely eliminates the in-
stallment contract as a distinct financing option, at least so long as purchasers realize 
their right to demand a foreclosure sale”); James Geoffrey Durham, Forfeiture of Residen-
tial Land Contracts in Ohio: The Need for Further Reform of a Reform Statute, 16 Akron 
L Rev 397, 401 (1983). 
 43 Moringiello, 100 Dickinson L Rev at 741–43 (cited in note 41) (reviewing various 
state methods to protect buyers from the forfeiture clause). 
 44 This Comment explores briefly how these patterns of discrimination were created 
and maintained by specific government policies. For a more complete look at this history, 
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Part II.B, because of this discrimination, the ILC further contrib-
uted to the wealth gap between White and Black communities in 
the 1950s and ’60s. However, the predatory concerns of the ILC 
were less pressing in the second half of the twentieth century be-
cause the Fair Housing Act of 196845 prohibited the de jure discrim-
ination that blocked Black Americans from entire sections of the 
housing market. Because of this protection, Black Americans were 
able to access traditional mortgages. Finally, Part II.C explores 
how the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis revived the ILC and its as-
sociated predatory risks when used in low-income communities.46 
A. The “Poor Man’s Mortgage”: The Midwest, Farming, and 
Railroads 
The ILC has “generally experienced a cyclical popularity in 
the midwest.”47 It first became popular in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, when railroads began selling off the land they 
had acquired in the course of building.48 Then, during the Great 
Depression, lending institutions used the ILC to resell land they 
took through the foreclosure process.49 During this period, ILCs 
tended to be more buyer-friendly because these companies were 
eager to get rid of the land.50 After World War II, the ILC once 
again surged in popularity due to an increased demand for low-
equity financing, increased secondary financing by landowners, 
and income tax savings.51 In Kansas alone, the number of farms 
purchased on contract more than tripled between 1946 and 
1960.52 Courts generally enforced these contracts, favoring free-
dom of contract and laissez-faire policies.53 
This history of the ILC led at least one jurist to call it the “poor 
man’s mortgage,”54 reflecting its status as a replacement financ-
ing device for those who may not qualify for traditional mortgages 
 
see generally Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Gov-
ernment Segregated America (Liveright 2017) (arguing that the federal government, and 
the Supreme Court in particular, sanctioned unconstitutional housing discrimination 
against Black Americans throughout the United States in the twentieth century). 
 45 Pub L No 90-284, 82 Stat 81, codified as amended at 42 USC § 3601 et seq. 
 46 See Burns, The Infamous Practice of Contract Selling (cited in note 21). 
 47 Hines, 12 U Kan L Rev at 476 (cited in note 28). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id at 476–77. 
 50 Id at 477. 
 51 Hines, 12 U Kan L Rev at 477 (cited in note 28). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Purcell, Note, 93 Notre Dame L Rev at 1773–74 (cited in note 40). 
 54 Ellis v Butterfield, 570 P2d 1334, 1336 (Idaho 1977). 
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and thus are more likely to agree to riskier contracts.55 That judge 
explained that “the vendor, as with a mortgage, finances the pur-
chaser’s acquisition of the property by accepting installment pay-
ments on the purchase price over a period of years, but the pur-
chaser does not receive the benefit of those remedial statutes 
protecting the rights of mortgagors.”56 
The early uses of the ILC attracted some concern about the 
harshness of the ILC forfeiture clause: In 1937, the New York 
Legislature proposed a bill57 to protect the rights of the purchaser, 
and by 1957, sixteen states had passed similar statutes.58 By 
1950, California courts had read into the law strong protections 
against forfeiture.59 As the next sections explore, these protec-
tions did very little to safeguard communities from the most in-
sidious aspects of the ILC, which became especially prevalent in 
minority communities that were shut out from other homeowner-
ship markets. 
B. Racial Discrimination and the Contract Buyers League 
By the 1950s, the ILC gained prominence in urban centers as 
a result of racial discrimination by both private and government 
actors.60 As a sign of how widespread and notorious the ILC be-
came in this period, Ta-Nehisi Coates’s The Case for Reparations 
framed its narrative through the history of the ILC in Chicago.61 
For example, between 1934 and 1968, an estimated 85 percent of 
homes purchased by Black Americans in Chicago were purchased 
via ILC.62 A major reason for the ILC’s prominence among Black 
Americans was the Federal Housing Administration’s discrimina-
tory policies. The Federal Housing Administration’s practices left 
the door open for lenders looking to profit off hopeful Black home-
buyers. In response, private actors were able to offer 
 
 55 See Hines, 12 U Kan L Rev at 476 (cited in note 28). 
 56 Ellis, 570 P2d at 1336. 
 57 Act, Recommendation, and Study Relating to Installment Land Contracts, NY 
State Law Revision Commission, Legislative (1937). 
 58 Richard K. Jacoby, Note, Forfeiture of Payments Under a Land Purchase Contract 
in Montana, 19 Mont L Rev 50, 51 (1957). 
 59 See, for example, Barkis v Scott, 208 P2d 367, 371–72 (Cal 1949) (holding that 
buyers who negligently defaulted were still entitled to specific performance, having paid 
a substantial portion of the contract price). 
 60 Rothstein, The Color of Law at 77 (cited in note 44) (“[T]he [Federal Housing Ad-
ministration] sponsored whites-only suburbanization in the mid-twentieth century.”). 
 61 Coates, The Case for Reparations (cited in note 6). 
 62 Cameron Custard, Comment, Installment Land Contracts & Low-Income Home-
buyers in Chicago: A Call for Legislative Reform, 67 DePaul L Rev 527, 534–35 (2018). 
2284 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:2029 
 
extraordinarily predatory terms to Black Americans who were 
simply looking to share in the American Dream. What happened 
was in stark contrast to that dream: “Blacks were herded into the 
sights of unscrupulous lenders who took them for money and for 
sport.”63 These Black Americans, in seeking to create a foundation 
of prosperity for their children, were shut out from the new mort-
gage market which would become the foundation for many White 
families to build wealth for generations to come. 
The Federal Housing Administration, founded in 1934, was 
widely celebrated for making homeownership accessible—though 
this success was, by design, limited to White people.64 Thus, “the 
[Federal Housing Administration] explicitly refused to back loans 
to black people or even other people who lived near black peo-
ple.”65 The government’s Home Owners’ Loan Corporation 
(HOLC) used data and evaluations from local real estate profes-
sionals to assign grades to community areas. The grades ranged 
from “A” to “D.” Neighborhoods that were considered minimal 
risk in terms of mortgage security and therefore were safe invest-
ments for homebuyers and lenders alike received “A” grades, 
whereas neighborhoods that were considered “hazardous” re-
ceived “D” grades.66 This is now commonly known as “redlining,” 
because the “D” areas were colored in red on the HOLC’s maps. 
The HOLC used explicitly racial and racist criteria in evaluat-
ing neighborhoods. The HOLC codes for the maps described green 
areas as “hot spots” that were “homogeneous”; blue areas were 
“completely developed” but “still good”; yellow areas had “expiring 
restrictions or lack of them[, and] infiltration of a lower grade pop-
ulation”; and red areas had “detrimental influences” such as “un-
desirable population or infiltration of it.”67 The North Lawndale 
neighborhood in Chicago—a neighborhood that looms prominently 
in the history of the ILC in Chicago as explored below—was a col-
lection of C (“Definitely Declining”) and D (“Hazardous”) grade 
 
 63 Coates, The Case for Reparations (cited in note 6). Coates further provided a quote 
from a housing attorney: “It was like people who like to go out and shoot lions in Africa. It 
was the same thrill. . . . The thrill of the chase and the kill.” Id. 
 64 Alexis C. Madrigal, The Racist Housing Policy That Made Your Neighborhood (The 
Atlantic, May 22, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/TN9C-W5RR. See also Rothstein, The 
Color of Law at 63–67 (cited in note 44) (exploring the policies of the Federal Housing Admin-
istration and the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) and their racial implications). 
 65 Madrigal, The Racist Housing Policy (cited in note 64) (emphasis in original). 
 66 Introduction, in Robert K. Nelson, et al, Mapping Inequality: Redlining in New 
Deal America (Digital Scholarship Lab of University of Richmond), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/H2GL-FBFA. 
 67 Madrigal, The Racist Housing Policy (cited in note 64) (emphasis omitted). 
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areas.68 North Lawndale’s demographics changed drastically in 
the middle of the twentieth century. In 1930, 99.6 percent of its 
residents were White.69 In 1946, North Lawndale was home to ap-
proximately one quarter of Chicago’s Jewish population.70 By 
1960, 91.1 percent of North Lawndale’s residents were Black.71 
The description of one area in North Lawndale is emblematic of 
the racial concerns of the HOLC: 
The future of this area is most uncertain. About 50% of the 
houses are pressing for sale by institutions who have been 
dumping their holdings in the neighborhood during the past 
year. Demand is very weak and limi[te]d to low-class Ital-
ian[s] who will buy only at sacrifice prices. The few Jewish 
buyers will not pay normal prices either, and rents obtaina-
ble are not sufficient to meet operating expenses. Vandalism 
is prevalent and vacant units must maintain a caretaker. Ne-
gro [sic] is filtering in, first as caretakers, and then moving 
in their families to occupy basement rooms not equipped as 
living quarters. . . . No sales [ha]ve been made to Negroes [sic] 
yet, but it is doubtful that they can be held out long. Streets 
and alleys are full of filth and properties poorly maintained.72 
Another area description worried about what was to become of 
the neighborhood: it noted that “less desirable populace from 
closer to town areas are spreading into this section,” that “[c]os-
mopolitan population is definitely adversely affecting prices and 
general desirability,” and that the locality “gives the appearance 
of becoming a slum area.”73 Yet another section indicated that 
“Neg[r]o encroachment is threatening.”74 A fourth note describing 
a North Lawndale area stated that “Jewish [sic] moving from east 
 
 68 Chicago, IL, in Nelson, et al, Mapping Inequality (cited in note 66), online at 
https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/#loc=9/41.944/-88.32&city=chicago-il (visited 
May 17, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 69 Amanda Seligman, North Lawndale (Encyclopedia of Chicago), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/HS7C-SE22. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Chicago, IL: Area D35 (emphasis added), in Nelson, et al, Mapping Inequality 
(cited in note 66), online at https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/#loc=9/41.944/ 
-88.32&city=chicago-il&area=D35 (visited May 17, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 73 Chicago, IL: Area D36, in Nelson, et al, Mapping Inequality (cited in note 66), 
online at https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/#loc=9/41.944/-88.32&city=chicago 
-il&area=D36 (visited May 17, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 74 Chicago, IL: Area C161, in Nelson, et al, Mapping Inequality (cited in note 66), 
online at https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/#loc=9/41.944/-88.32&city=chicago 
-il&area=C161 (visited May 17, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
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side of Pulaski into this neighborhood, but area continues to hold 
many original owners,” and that the “[p]roperties [are] fairly 
priced . . . but buyers are largely Jewish and sharp bargainers.”75 
Based on grades and descriptions like these, the Federal 
Housing Administration refused to provide insurance for mort-
gages in majority Black neighborhoods.76 Sellers stepped into the 
gap, offering seller-financed ILCs with predatory terms.77 The end 
result was huge windfalls for those who “sold” houses via ILC and 
devastating, long-lasting effects for the neighborhoods deemed 
undesirable.78 According to Coates, “[c]ontract sellers became 
rich. North Lawndale became a ghetto.”79 Sellers made huge prof-
its because they forced the buyers to be responsible for repairs, 
taxes, and insurance—all on top of their monthly payments. They 
also used the forfeiture clauses to remove buyers quickly if and 
when they defaulted.80 Sellers then resold the home on contract, 
starting the cycle again. 
In the 1960s, these practices led to the formation of the Con-
tract Buyers League (CBL) in North Lawndale.81 The group was 
a “coalition of socially progressive Catholics, black members of the 
Lawndale neighborhood in Chicago, where [50] percent of the 
homes were purchased on installment contracts, and white col-
lege students.”82 The CBL engaged in several campaigns to com-
bat the predatory ILC market: they picketed, instituted a strike 
on making their monthly payments, raised money to appeal evic-
tions if an eviction order had been put in place, and, ultimately, 
physically resisted eviction if necessary.83 But when these at-
tempts were unsuccessful, the CBL turned to the courts. 
 
 75 Chicago, IL: Area C160, in Nelson, et al, Mapping Inequality (cited in note 66), 
online at https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/#loc=9/41.944/-88.32&city=chicago 
-il&area=C160 (visited May 17, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 76 Custard, Comment, 67 DePaul L Rev at 535 (cited in note 62). 
 77 See Megan S. Wright, Installment Housing Contracts: Presumptively Unconscion-
able, 18 Berkeley J Afr Am L & Pol 97, 100–04 (2016). 
 78 See Coates, The Case for Reparations (cited in note 6) (noting that some scholars 
have compared the influx of sellers to people who go hunting lions for the thrill). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Wright, 18 Berkeley J Afr Am L & Pol at 102 (cited in note 77). 
 81 Coates, The Case for Reparations (cited in note 6). The group formed in 1968 to 
challenge predatory ILCs in North Lawndale. James Alan McPherson, “In My Father’s 
House There Are Many Mansions—And I’m Going to Get Me Some of Them Too”: The Story 
of the Contract Buyers League, 229 Atlantic Monthly 51, 54–59 (Apr 1972). 
 82 Wright, 18 Berkeley J Afr Am L & Pol at 105 (cited in note 77). 
 83 Id. 
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In a pair of cases, the CBL alleged that sellers offering ILCs 
discriminated against them on the basis of race.84 The first case, 
Contract Buyers League v F&F Investments,85 made complaints 
under a number of civil rights statutes, and both the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.86 Relying on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Jones v Alfred H. Mayer Co,87 which held that the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 prohibited private discrimination in real estate 
sales, a district court in Chicago determined that there was “no 
reason to distinguish a refusal to sell on the ground of race and a 
sale on discriminatory prices and terms.”88 The court therefore de-
nied a motion to dismiss with respect to the claims under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866.89 However, the CBL was ultimately unable to 
convince a jury that discrimination had occurred.90 Specifically, 
the CBL was unable to show that Whites had received compara-
tively better contracts because some businesses sold only to 
Blacks, which made it difficult to prove that similarly situated 
White buyers received better contracts.91 These contract sellers 
didn’t sell to White people—they didn’t have to, and White people 
were generally able to qualify for traditional mortgage financing 
due to the support of the federal government. Further, some 
scholars have indicated that juries might have been less sympa-
thetic because housing prices rose between the time the contracts 
were written and the cases were heard, which made the prices 
seem reasonable by comparison.92 
In the second case, Clark v Universal Builders, Inc,93 the CBL 
proposed two theories of discrimination: a traditional theory of 
discriminatory intent, and a novel “exploitation” theory of dis-
crimination.94 The novel theory, which parallels modern disparate 
impact claims, alleged “1) that during the relevant time period a 
‘dual housing market’ existed as a result of residential segrega-
tion and 2) that defendants unlawfully took advantage of this 
 
 84 Id at 106. See generally Contract Buyers League v F & F Investment, 300 F Supp 
210 (ND Ill 1969); Clark v Universal Builders, Inc, 706 F2d 204 (7th Cir 1983). 
 85 300 F Supp 210 (ND Ill 1969). 
 86 Id at 213. 
 87 392 US 409 (1968). 
 88 Contract Buyers League, 300 F Supp at 216. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Wright, 18 Berkeley J Afr Am L & Pol at 107 (cited in note 77). 
 91 Id at 107 n 73. 
 92 Beryl Satter, Family Properties: Race, Real Estate, and the Exploitation of Black 
Urban America 367 (Metropolitan 2009). 
 93 706 F2d 204 (7th Cir 1983). 
 94 Id at 206. 
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situation by demanding unreasonable prices and terms of sale 
from plaintiffs.”95 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit concluded that 
the plaintiffs had not proven either theory and upheld the district 
court’s judgment in favor of the defendant.96 The Seventh Circuit 
noted that “plaintiffs succeeded in painting a deplorable picture 
of the discrimination reflected in Chicago housing patterns,” but 
the court did not find such evidence sufficient to establish the al-
leged “dual housing market.”97 However, the Seventh Circuit de-
termined that the exploitation theory could create a legally cog-
nizable injury, but that in this case, the CBL had failed to fully 
prove their case. 
Though the CBL was unsuccessful in its litigation efforts, its 
work helped to end the predatory use of ILCs in Black neighbor-
hoods. It drew attention from the public, creating enough pres-
sure that ultimately many buyers had the leverage to renegotiate 
the terms of their ILCs.98 The publicity around these cases also 
contributed to public pressure to end redlining, opening the tra-
ditional mortgage market to Black Americans to some extent.99 
Additionally, the CBL’s formation coincided with the passage of 
the Fair Housing Act in 1968.100 This timing was coincidental, a 
national response to the recently published Kerner Commission 
Report, which had warned of the increasing separation between 
White and Black communities in the United States.101 As such, 
the use of exploitative predatory lending and redlining was pro-
hibited by both federal and state legislation.102 The ILC did not 
entirely disappear during this time, but it was no longer the only 
way for many Black Americans to seek homeownership. 
However, the effects of these policies and exploitative prac-
tices have not disappeared. As Coates notes, “North Lawndale is 
now on the wrong end of virtually every socioeconomic indica-
tor.”103 This is reflective of a larger pattern: Black families are less 
 
 95 Id at 210. 
 96 Id at 213. 
 97 Clark, 706 F2d at 211. 
 98 Wright, 18 Berkeley J Afr Am L & Pol at 107 (cited in note 77). 
 99 Id. 
 100 See id at 105–07. 
 101 For background on the passage of the Fair Housing Act, see Emily A. Vernon, 
Comment, Exclusionary Advertising?: The Case for Cautious Enforcement of 42 USC 
§ 3604(c) Against Minority-Language Housing Advertisements, 87 U Chi L Rev 223, 232–
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 102 Custard, Comment, 67 DePaul L Rev at 536 (cited in note 62). 
 103 Coates, The Case for Reparations (cited in note 6). 
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wealthy than White families.104 They are less likely to be home-
owners.105 And in the wake of the Great Recession of 2008, the 
ILC is once again a concern for Black, minority, and low-income 
communities.106 
C. The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Return of the ILC 
In this Section, I explore the reemergence of the ILC as an 
increasingly popular financing tool in lieu of subprime mortgages 
after the 2008 housing crisis. First, I explore how and why the 
2008 crisis led to an increase in ILCs in the United States. Sec-
ond, I briefly describe the unique concern the “as is” deed raises 
in the modern ILC market. Finally, I explain how the 
reemergence of the ILC continues to be a threat to minority com-
munities in particular, both in light of the history above and the 
ripple effects of the subprime mortgage crisis. 
The exact forces that led to the 2008 financial crisis are be-
yond the scope of this Comment. The Washington Post summa-
rized the relevant details: “The housing market was ground zero 
of the crisis. The market crashed as homeowners with subprime 
and other troublesome loans defaulted at record levels. Home 
prices dropped, and millions lost their homes to foreclosure.”107 
These subprime loans were targeted at minority borrowers.108 The 
practices of lenders and banks during the lead-up to the 2008 cri-
sis has been referred to by scholars as “reverse redlining,” that is 
the “targeting of families in [formerly redlined] neighborhoods for 
high-risk loans.”109 This practice arose as minority homebuyers 
were able to access mortgage financing, and “took the form of tar-
geting racial or ethnic minorities for higher priced and risky 
 
 104 Id. 
 105 US Census Bureau, Quarterly Residential Vacancies and Homeownership, Third 
Quarter 2019 *9 (Oct 29, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/6JTA-UB4G. 
 106 Burns, The Infamous Practice of Contract Selling (cited in note 21); Wright, 18 
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.html (visited May 18, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 108 Emily Badger, The Dramatic Racial Bias of Subprime Lending During the Hous-
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loans.”110 Due to these practices, minority borrowers were more 
likely than White borrowers to receive risky loans and thus were 
more likely to be foreclosed upon and lose their homes in the 2008 
housing crisis. 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the state and federal 
governments both acted against subprime lenders. A number of 
cities and municipalities brought suit under the Fair Housing Act 
against banks that offered subprime mortgages.111 The federal 
government passed the Dodd-Frank Act,112 which among other 
things required lenders to verify that a buyer would be able to 
repay the mortgage.113 This increased regulation has had an un-
intended side effect: it has made it more difficult for low-income, 
low-credit-score Americans to obtain traditional mortgages.114 
Those who were foreclosed upon have the additional concern of a 
mark on their credit reports, making it even more difficult for 
these individuals to try again at homeownership.115 With new reg-
ulations designed to prevent reverse redlining, sellers were once 
again looking for alternative financing options for those who did 
not qualify for a traditional mortgage. 
This new market of potential homeowners who were effec-
tively shut out of the traditional mortgage market helped lead to 
the resurgence of ILCs. Moreover, for sellers, the number of fore-
closures put homes on the market for relatively cheap.116 The com-
bination of homes for sale at low prices and individuals unable to 
access traditional mortgages created a new investment market: 
seller-financed contracts using the ILC.117 Matthew Goldstein and 
Alexandra Stevenson of the New York Times reported that 
“[b]efore the housing crisis, low-income buyers got too much of a 
house that they couldn’t afford. Now, they are getting too little of 
a house that they can’t afford to repair.”118 
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 111 See, for example, Bank of America Corp v City of Miami, 137 S Ct 1296, 1301–03 
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In 2009, the last year for which this data is available, more 
than three million people lived in homes that they were paying 
for via an ILC.119 There are good reasons to think this number has 
increased in the years since, though nationwide data does not ex-
ist. Local data supports this conclusion. In 2015, in Detroit, more 
homebuyers entered into ILCs than traditional mortgages.120 
Data from the three large investment firms that dominate the 
modern ILC market—Harbour Portfolio Advisors, Vision Prop-
erty Management, and Battery Point Financial—also indicate 
that the number of ILCs has increased since the mortgage cri-
sis.121 Since 2010, Harbour has purchased about seven thousand 
homes nationwide.122 These ILCs all contain terms that have been 
termed predatory by scholars. The Chicago Reader completed an 
analysis of Chicago contracts from each of these three companies, 
and concluded that all include the following terms: requirements 
that buyers purchase “as is”; forfeiture clauses; and interest rates 
between 8 and 10 percent, which is roughly twice the current in-
terest rate for federally backed bank loans. Further, they over-
whelmingly involve properties in minority neighborhoods.123 
The “as is” nature of the contracts has become an increasing 
concern in the modern market, as many of the houses being sold 
were vacated in the housing crisis and have since fallen into dis-
repair.124 The homes being sold via ILC are often substandard—
rotting wood, black mold, broken windows, and failing founda-
tions are just a few of the concerns faced by ILC buyers.125 Some 
buyers enter into the contract only to discover that they must 
quickly remedy property code violations, or that the house is al-
ready condemned.126 Either because of increased media coverage 
of the ILC’s use or because of the shocking level of housing qual-
ity, the “as is” clause in these contracts has come to be seen as one 
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of the primary predatory terms included in ILCs. Though the 
prevalence of “as is” deeds in ILCs had been a concern before this 
most recent upswing in usage, this concern is heightened now, 
especially as the homes sold via ILCs are often homes that have 
been vacant since the 2008 foreclosure crisis. 
Moreover, the racial concerns highlighted in Part II.B con-
tinue to raise alarms in the modern market. There are reports 
that the market for ILCs is aimed at Black and Latinx homebuy-
ers,127 both because they are disproportionately lower income and 
because of the historical housing policies discussed above. Given 
the racial discrimination concerns surrounding the subprime 
mortgage crisis, the ILC market is likely centered in minority 
neighborhoods.128 Ultimately, the revival of the ILC appears 
poised to continue to target minority communities. 
III.  CURRENT APPROACHES: STATUTORY SOLUTIONS AND 
MANDATORY DISCLOSURE 
Since 2010, a number of states have committed to renewed 
legislative attempts to deal with the various issues posed by the 
ILC.129 These newer laws largely recognize the predatory concerns 
outlined in Part II, but seek to balance effective regulation with 
maintaining the market for ILCs. This Part surveys these laws, 
focusing on certain provisions that appear across several regula-
tory schemes or that are particularly innovative. For most com-
mentators, statutory reforms are the preferred solution to the 
risks posed by the ILC.130 Scholars arguing for such reforms have 
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focused on certain types of reforms: (1) mandatory disclosures of 
repair and tax obligations and provision of regular accounting 
statements of what is owed on the property; (2) independent in-
spections and appraisals; (3) requiring sellers to record contracts 
to ensure that there is a public record of the contract; and (4) de-
fault provisions that grant buyers protections similar to those 
available in eviction settings, such as cure periods. This Comment 
argues that legislatures and judges should be more aggressive in 
regulating the ILC, especially in regard to eliminating the forfei-
ture clause and protecting buyers from “as is” deeds for uninhab-
itable homes.131 In sum, my approach relies on much stronger leg-
islative protections, while attempting to think seriously about the 
complications of ensuring those protections are meaningful on the 
ground. 
This Part begins by exploring common legislative reforms 
passed to protect ILC buyers, many of which have been proposed 
by scholars over the years. It is focused on reforms that have been 
enacted since 2010 and thus are more likely animated by concerns 
relevant to the modern ILC market. Of particular interest is 
Texas, because extensive ILC legislation has been on the books 
since 1995, with various reforms passed over the last two dec-
ades.132 With the exception of Oklahoma, which has treated the 
ILC as a full mortgage since 1976,133 Texas has been the most ag-
gressive state in legislating protections for ILC buyers. 
I also include comparisons of provisions from other states that 
have passed comprehensive ILC legislation in an attempt to pro-
vide as nationwide a picture as possible. Along with Texas, I sur-
vey comprehensive ILC legislation from California, Illinois, North 
Carolina, and Virginia. Unfortunately, it is not possible to indi-
cate how most states treat the ILC—legislation varies widely 
across the country, and where there is not legislation, state courts 
have established various judicial rules regarding the ILC. Thus, 
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of Property. See Restatement (Third) of Property § 3.4 (1997). 
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this Part focuses on types of provisions that are especially com-
mon in legislation. Part III.A surveys provisions which protect 
buyers at the time of signing the ILC, including mandatory dis-
closures and cooling-off periods. Part III.B looks at legislative pro-
visions that attempt to counteract the more insidious effects of 
“as is” deeds. Part III.C provides an overview of terms that legis-
latures have defined as per se unconscionable in every ILC. The 
last Section focusing on statutory reforms, Part III.D, explores 
legislative provisions designed to protect ILC buyers who default, 
focusing on cure periods and alternative dispute resolution pro-
ceedings. Finally, since Texas’s statute has been on the books for 
more than two decades, Part III.E concludes by exploring the im-
pact this legislation has had on ILCs in the state, with a specific 
discussion of their use in colonias, Spanish-language communi-
ties on the Mexican border that tend to be low income.134 
A. Signing the Contract: Mandatory Disclosures, Cooling-Off 
Periods, and Mandatory Recording 
The statutes examined in this Comment include a number of 
provisions intended to educate and inform the buyer at the time 
the contract is entered into. These provisions might require a 
seller to certify that the property is in compliance with property 
and building codes,135 disclose certain legal rights of the buyer136 
and the seller’s legal interest,137 perform appraisals or inspec-
tions, or provide mandatory cooling-off periods for the buyer to 
exit the contract without penalty.138 These provisions are de-
signed to deal with the fact that most buyers entering into these 
contracts will do so without legal assistance. 
The efficacy of these provisions is doubtful. As Professors 
Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider have explored, manda-
tory disclosures rarely provide true protection or education for 
 
 134 See generally Peter M. Ward, Heather K. Way, and Lucille Wood, “The Contract 
for Deed Prevalence Project”: A Final Report to the Texas Department of Housing and Com-
munity Affairs (TDHCA) (University of Texas at Austin, Aug 2012), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/JQK7-DU94. 
 135 765 ILCS § 67/10(c)(24); NC Gen Stat Ann § 47H-2(b)(14a); Cal Civ Code 
§ 2985.51. 
 136 Tex Prop Code Ann § 5.071; NC Gen Stat Ann § 47H-2(b)–(c). 
 137 765 ILCS § 67/10(c) (requiring disclosure of, among other things, any unpaid prop-
erty taxes, the seller’s interest in the property, and any known encumbrances on the prop-
erty); NC Gen Stat Ann § 47H-2(b)(15). 
 138 NC Gen Stat Ann § 47H-2(c) (providing a cooling-off period of three business days); 
765 ILCS § 67/70 (same); Tex Prop Code Ann § 5.074 (providing a cooling-off period of 
fourteen days). 
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consumers.139 Mandated disclosures are nonetheless popular, be-
cause they appear to be relatively simple solutions to the concerns 
about predatory contract terms.140 They also appeal to free-market 
preferences of many Americans, who think that it is better to en-
sure people truly know the risks of their contracts than to pater-
nalistically ban the contracts altogether.141 
Of course, some of these provisions go beyond simply inform-
ing buyers of their rights. Mandatory cooling-off periods provide 
a period of time during which buyers can rescind their acceptance 
of the contract with no penalty.142 The idea behind cooling-off pe-
riods is to give buyers a certain amount of time to ensure they 
actually want to enter into these contracts. It also provides them 
time to fully review the contract they have signed—though it is 
less than clear that this is any more effective than simply inform-
ing a buyer of their rights and responsibilities.143 Cooling-off peri-
ods only protect consumers to the extent that they take advantage 
of them to seriously consider the contract they have entered 
into.144 They can never be more than a partial protection.145 
Perhaps the most effective of these provisions are those re-
quiring sellers to record a contract within a certain period of 
time.146 Recording land contracts ensures that the legal interest 
 
 139 Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 
U Pa L Rev 647, 665 (2011). 
 140 Id at 682. 
 141 Id at 681 (“It supposes that people make better decisions for themselves than an-
yone can make for them and that people are entitled to freedom in making decisions.”). 
 142 See Federal Trade Commission, Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales, 37 Fed 
Reg 22934, 22935 (Oct 26, 1972) (“This will serve as a cooling-off period during which any 
consumer, who may be subjected to the unfair pressures resulting from the deceptions we 
have discussed or similar deceits, may reevaluate and cancel her purchase.”). The cooling-
off period is a popular consumer protection device, which ostensibly seeks to allow buyers 
to make rational choices by giving them time to reconsider the contract they have signed. 
 143 A study from Australia indicated that “[w]hen customers are offered a ‘cooling off’ 
period, they don’t change their minds, even when the alternative is considered subjectively 
better.” Paul Harrison, Cooling-Off Periods for Consumers Don’t Work: Study (The Con-
versation, Nov 28, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/A2YB-5RHG. 
 144 Id (“In the context of cooling-off periods (and thus changing our minds), research 
shows it takes a significant amount of cognitive resources to admit we made a mistake. 
Again, this is not a conscious use of resources, but happens regardless of how rational we 
think we are.”). 
 145 37 Fed Reg at 22935 (cited in note 142) (noting that a comprehensive UCLA Law 
Review report that surveyed the direct selling industry “concluded that the cooling-off con-
cept should be encouraged, although it recognized that it would not provide a complete 
remedy for all of the consumer problems”). 
 146 765 ILCS § 67/20 (requiring the seller record the contract within ten business days 
of sale); Tex Prop Code Ann § 5.076 (requiring the seller record within thirty days of sale); 
NC Gen Stat Ann § 47H-2(d) (requiring recordation within five business days of signing); 
2296 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:2029 
 
of the buyer is public information. As such, if a buyer is subject to 
an eviction, it ensures that any lawyer would be aware of the ILC 
and, in theory, it also makes that information available to 
judges.147 If a legal aid lawyer is able to analyze the contract be-
cause it has been recorded, the lawyer will be able to appropri-
ately defend the buyer and determine what, if any, additional 
rights a buyer may have beyond the eviction statutes. In theory, 
if the judge has access to the contract as well, the judge can appro-
priately apply any ILC law; in practice, this is unlikely to happen. 
Further, recording limits the ability of the seller to further en-
cumber the property, by placing “a cloud on the property’s title, 
giving notice of the buyer’s interest in the property to potential 
subsequent purchasers and rendering the title unmarketable.”148 
The purpose of this protection is to ensure that sellers are not 
transferring the property multiple times or getting loans based 
on the property. This ensures that if buyers pay off their install-
ments under the contract, they can actually receive marketable 
title, rather than title encumbered by other liens or interests that 
the seller placed on the property. Many commentators have ad-
vised requiring recording contracts,149 though it is less than clear 
that recordation protects against any of the most concerning as-
pects of the ILC. Recording does, however, protect buyers in the 
event a seller files for bankruptcy, fails to pay taxes or liens, or 
attempts to sell the property to a third party.150 
B. Managing “As Is” Deeds: Landlord-Tenant Law and Other 
Solutions 
“As is” deeds are common in ILCs and are the source of many 
of the predatory aspects of these contracts. As Professor Eric T. 
Freyfogle explored in the 1980s, many of the biggest concerns 
about the ILC involve issues of substandard housing and the re-
pair obligations of buyers and sellers.151 These concerns continue 
to haunt the ILC, as explored in Part II.C. Statutory solutions 
 
Cal Civ Code § 2985.2 (making it a public offense to fail to record a contract and then cause 
the property to be encumbered without notice to other parties); Va Code Ann § 55.1-
3002(C) (allowing ILCs to be recorded, but not requiring such). 
 147 However, the fact that housing court judges have access to information does not 
at all guarantee they will access and use that information. See Summers, The Limits of 
Good Law, 87 U Chi L Rev at 202 (cited in note 13). 
 148 Custard, Comment, 67 DePaul L Rev at 545 (cited in note 62). 
 149 See id; Mancini and Saunders, 28 Communities & Bank at 11 (cited in note 130). 
 150 Custard, Comment, 67 DePaul L Rev at 546 (cited in note 62). 
 151 Freyfogle, 62 NYU L Rev at 304–10 (cited in note 13). 
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seek to resolve these issues in a variety of ways. Some states use 
disclosures to ensure that buyers are aware of the risks as well as 
statements that clearly divide responsibility for repairs between 
buyers and sellers.152 Other states apply landlord-tenant law to 
ILCs.153 In a novel approach, Illinois provides that sellers shall 
credit any costs that buyers incurred repairing issues that existed 
presale to buyers’ debt in the event of a default.154 
All these provisions target the same concern: that “as is” deeds 
allow sellers to avoid any repair costs that they would be liable 
for if they rented out the property, while also avoiding the costs 
associated with regulated mortgages. Some states have turned to 
their landlord-tenant laws for guidance on how to protect ILC 
buyers, since every state has developed some amount of habita-
bility protections for tenants. Freyfogle advocated for such an ap-
proach, but he appeared to rely on an optimistic view of the pro-
tections afforded by landlord-tenant law.155 Freyfogle proposed 
that in certain situations, ILCs should be treated as leases, and 
he thus provided a functional-equivalence test that would have 
applied the implied warranty of habitability to those ILCs.156 The 
implied warranty of habitability seeks to protect tenants by cre-
ating a floor of acceptable housing and allowing tenants to either 
deduct the cost of repairs from rent or to defend themselves in an 
eviction case by asserting that the housing was below the appli-
cable standard.157 It has not been as successful in protecting ten-
ants as initially hoped and is thus unlikely to protect ILC buyers.158 
Perhaps the best of these provisions attempting to deal with 
the insidious effects of “as is” deed clauses is the requirement that 
buyers be allowed to credit repair costs toward their default.159 
Such a provision theoretically protects buyers from the choice 
 
 152 765 ILCS § 67/10(c)(20) (mandating the seller be in charge of any repairs not spe-
cifically made the responsibility of the buyer in the original contract); NC Gen Stat Ann 
§ 47H-2(b)(12). 
 153 Tex Prop Code Ann § 5.0621 (incorporating by reference the lease protections at 
Tex Prop Code Ann § 92); Va Code Ann § 55.1-3002(A). 
 154 765 ILCS § 67/80. 
 155 See Summers, 87 U Chi L Rev at 208–10 (cited in note 13) (finding that without 
the aid of a lawyer, the implied warranty of habitability provides little protection to ten-
ants); Kim Barker, Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Grace Ashford, and Sarah Cohen, The Evic-
tion Machine Churning Through New York City (NY Times, May 20, 2018), archived at 
https://perma.cc/VNK3-FCKZ (noting that eviction court rarely protects the interests of 
tenants). 
 156 Freyfogle, 62 NYU L Rev at 312 (cited in note 13). 
 157 See Summers, 87 U Chi L Rev at 159–60 (cited in note 13). 
 158 Id at 210. 
 159 765 ILCS § 67/80. 
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between repairing their home and defaulting on their monthly 
payments, which was a big concern for many of the contract buy-
ers in the CBL.160 But such a provision cannot be successful if buy-
ers are unaware of their legal rights—a concern which underlies 
many of these statutory protections that fall short of totally ban-
ning the ILC. 
C. Unconscionable Terms: Prepayment, Arbitration, and 
Waiving Protections 
Legislatures have also passed laws directed at ILCs which 
deem certain contract terms per se unconscionable. This Section 
surveys the provisions that have been deemed by certain legisla-
tures to be problematic enough so as to void them entirely as con-
trary to public policy.161 The surveyed legislation is particularly 
likely to ban any provisions requiring the buyer to pay a prepay-
ment penalty—that is, any term that requires the buyer to pay 
an additional fee if they pay off any portion of their loan early.162 
Additionally, most of the statutes void any terms that would 
waive the law’s protective provisions, thus ensuring sellers can-
not contract around the law.163 Further, Illinois specifically voids 
certain arbitration provisions for fear of inequitable resolution,164 
and Texas and North Carolina limit the late fees that may be as-
sessed, which is a popular provision to ensure that late fees do not 
become unduly burdensome.165 North Carolina’s law includes a 
provision that requires sellers hold title to any property they seek 
to convey via ILC, thus ensuring that sellers are not selling prop-
erty they do not own and not selling the property at a later date 
to a third party.166 
These statutes seek to address terms that the legislature has 
deemed contrary to public policy. However, they are only effective 
if they can be thoroughly enforced by the courts, which may well 
require buyers to retain counsel, or for courts to be more 
 
 160 Coates, The Case for Reparations (cited in note 6). 
 161 All states considered in Part III have passed at least one provision in legislation 
that certain terms are to be considered per se unconscionable in ILCs. 
 162 Tex Prop Code Ann § 5.071(6); 765 ILCS § 67/60; Va Code Ann § 55.1-3002(B)(1); Cal 
Civ Code § 2985.6(a) (providing buyers with a right to prepay the balance, with an exception 
allowing the buyer to prohibit prepayment for the first twelve months after the sale). 
 163 765 ILCS § 67/50; Tex Prop Code Ann § 5.073(b); Cal Civ Code § 2985.6(b); Va 
Code Ann § 55.1-3002(D). 
 164 765 ILCS § 67/55. 
 165 Tex Prop Code Ann § 5.073(a)(1); NC Gen Stat Ann § 47H-7. 
 166 NC Gen Stat § 47H-6(a). 
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aggressive when dealing with ILC cases. This Comment suggests 
that courts and legislatures should consider the combination of 
“as is” conveyances via ILC and forfeiture clauses unconscionable 
and unenforceable. Such aggressive legislation substantially de-
creases the rights of the seller and could be criticized for disincen-
tivizing sellers from offering these contracts. As explored in 
Part IV, to the extent that sellers will only offer ILCs if they are 
predatory, the law should not protect their right to prey on low-
income communities. 
D. Protecting the Buyer in Default: Cure Periods and 
Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Arguably, the most important provisions in any of these stat-
utes are those that deal with forfeiture clauses and what occurs 
when a buyer fails to make a payment or defaults in some other 
way. Most of these laws draw on eviction statutes to create some 
amount of protection for defaulting buyers. Thus, most statutes 
create a cure period. This is a period of time after default when 
buyers are able to “cure” their default by paying what they owe to 
avoid forfeiture. Illinois, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia 
have all passed laws which provide a mandatory cure period for 
ILC buyers who default.167 Curiously, neither Illinois nor Virginia 
requires the seller to provide the buyer with a notice of default. 
The failure to include a notice provision is surprising because it 
is unclear if a buyer, who has not received notice of their default, 
will actually be motivated to cure their default. Generally, states 
require that landlords provide renters with notice that they have 
failed to pay rent on time and then provide a cure period during 
which the renter may pay off the rent that is owed. Virginia’s stat-
ute merely states the seller “may serve notice of [ ] default,” and 
that purchasers are entitled to a thirty-day cure period after no-
tice when default is based on a failure to pay.168 Illinois simply 
created a ninety-day cure period that begins on the “date of the 
default” and fails to require any notice to the purchaser.169 A cure 
period without any kind of notice requirement is relatively 
 
 167 765 ILCS § 67/40 (creating a ninety-day cure period); Tex Prop Code Ann §§ 5.065, 
5.066(b) (creating a thirty-day or sixty-day cure period for buyers under certain condi-
tions); Va Code Ann § 55.1-3002(B)(2) (creating a thirty-day cure period for default based 
on failure to pay); NC Gen Stat Ann § 47H-4(a)(5) (creating a thirty-day cure period). 
 168 Va Code Ann § 55.1-3002(B)(2) (emphasis added). 
 169 765 ILCS § 67/40. 
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toothless—a buyer could default and be entirely unaware of their 
right to cure. 
Because the laws in both Virginia and Illinois lack notice re-
quirements, the more effective cure periods exist in the North 
Carolina and Texas statutes. North Carolina has a series of notice 
requirements that must be provided to the buyer before the seller 
may exercise their right to forfeiture.170 If the buyer fails to cure, 
the purchaser’s interest in the ILC is terminated by either a mu-
tual termination executed by both parties and recorded,171 or by a 
final judgment from a court.172 
The Texas statute effectively destroys the forfeiture clause af-
ter the first thirty days of the contract.173 It does not do this by 
plain statement, but rather by requiring ILCs to be recorded 
within the first thirty days174 and prohibiting the use of the forfei-
ture remedy if a contract has been recorded.175 Further, if the 
buyer has made the equivalent of forty-eight monthly payments 
or paid more than 40 percent of the total amount, the buyer has 
a right to a sixty-day cure period rather than the typical thirty-
day period.176 
The Texas statute has created a complex alternative post-
default process for ILCs, which does not rely either on Texas land-
lord-tenant law or Texas mortgage foreclosure law. But even this 
aggressive alternative process has failed to meaningfully protect 
buyers, as explored in Part III.E. After the contract has been rec-
orded or the buyer has made the appropriate payments, if the 
buyer defaults and fails to cure within the required cure period, 
there is a statutory sale process, which goes through a seller-
appointed trustee.177 Any sale proceeds that exceed the total 
amount due to the seller go to the purchaser.178 The creation of 
this trustee provision ensures that a third party is involved in the 
process, which should theoretically protect the buyer more than 
the typical forfeiture process. Of course, as with all these provi-
sions, this requires that regulators or courts enforce the various 
requirements of this statute—none of these protections are any 
 
 170 NC Gen Stat Ann § 47H-3 (incorporating by reference NC Gen Stat § 47H-4). 
 171 NC Gen Stat Ann § 47H-2(e)(1). 
 172 NC Gen Stat Ann § 47H-2(e)(2) (also indicating that such judgment must be recorded). 
 173 Compare Tex Prop Code Ann § 5.064, with Tex Prop Code Ann § 5.066. 
 174 Tex Prop Code Ann § 5.076. 
 175 Tex Prop Code Ann § 5.064(4). 
 176 Tex Prop Code Ann § 5.066. 
 177 Tex Prop Code Ann § 5.066. 
 178 Tex Prop Code Ann § 5.066(e). 
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good if buyers are unaware of their rights. Nor are these protec-
tions helpful if courts are unaware of them when they are dealing 
with an ILC and subsequently fail to provide the necessary dis-
pute resolution mechanisms prescribed by statute, including en-
suring that the forfeiture clause is not enforced. Thus, even 
though the Texas statute provides extensive protection, its failure 
to clearly outlaw the use of the forfeiture clause creates a risk that 
buyers will be unable to take advantage of these protections. 
E. The Texas Solution: The Impact of ILC Regulation on the 
ILC Market 
Given the Texas statute’s roundabout way of nearly eradicat-
ing the forfeiture clause, this Section examines the effect of this 
legislation on the use of ILCs in Texas. In August 2012, the Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin published a study examining the use of 
the ILC in the state, specifically in border colonias.179 There are 
2,294 colonias in Texas, where “the term has come to refer to un-
incorporated makeshift communities in rural areas beyond the 
municipal boundaries of the nearest cities and towns.”180 “Colo-
nias are among the most poverty-stricken communities” in Texas 
in which the median household income is less than $30,000 a year 
and more than 40 percent of residents live under the poverty 
line.181 For comparison, the national average of people living un-
der the poverty line is 14.3 percent.182 The study found that, 
across ten counties from 1989–2010, the number of ILCs recorded 
each year peaked in 2000–01 at 1,226, but then leveled out to 
around 450 contracts recorded each year.183 Counties where colo-
nias were common had the largest numbers of recorded ILCs.184 
The study noted that ILC buyers have very low success 
rates—in one county the researchers found that, since 1989, fewer 
than one-fifth of ILC buyers had managed to own their home.185 
Forty-five percent of those contracts had been cancelled at the 
time of the study, with the remainder still active as ILCs.186 This 
is in stark contrast to the traditional mortgage. Of mortgages 
 
 179 Ward, Way, and Wood, CFD Prevalence Project at *II (cited in note 134). 
 180 Patrick Strickland, Living on the Edges: Life in the Colonias of Texas (Al Jazeera, 
Nov 5, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/8WN5-7VZ3. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Ward, Way, and Wood, CFD Prevalence Project at ch 3 *8 (cited in note 134). 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id at ch 3 *13. 
 186 Id. 
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originated between 2004 and 2008, only 6.4 percent of mortgagors 
nationwide had lost their homes through foreclosure by February 
2011.187 The study further found that despite recording require-
ments, unrecorded ILCs are still prevalent throughout Texas.188 
Ultimately, despite claims about the law destroying the mar-
ket for ILCs in Texas, the ILC continues to be prevalent in low-
income and Latinx communities.189 Notably, when the Texas leg-
islation was first passed in 1995 it only applied to border coun-
ties,190 indicating the legislature was specifically concerned about 
its usage in these communities. However, in spite of this intent, 
the ILC “remains in active use in many border counties,”191 and in 
some counties, its usage has remained the same or even increased 
since the regulations were passed.192 The continued popularity of 
the ILC in these communities is due to a number of factors, from 
the incredible poverty that defines these colonias to the inability 
to access traditional mortgage financing to the lack of information 
about rights and protections under ILC regulations.193 The ILC is 
common in Texas “wherever there is poverty, limited infrastruc-
ture, and shoddy housing conditions.”194 This study bears out the 
concerns addressed above about the limits of statutory reform—
without enforcement provisions that do not rely on complex legal 
defenses, ILC statutory reform cannot protect low-income and mi-
nority communities from the risks posed by the ILC. Given the 
established failure of ILC regulation in Texas, Part IV explores 
some of the reasons behind why these regulations have failed. 
Part IV also provides an explanation for why I do not recommend 
the eradication of the ILC as a financing tool in spite of its history 
and risks. Finally, Part V uses this information to propose effec-
tive reforms to more fully protect consumers. 
IV.  EXPLOITATION, EXTRACTIVE MARKETS, AND THE ILC 
Given the failure of ILC regulation to meaningfully protect 
consumers, the easiest answer would appear to be entirely out-
lawing ILCs. This is the “cleanest and most effective way to 
 
 187 Ward, Way, and Wood, CFD Prevalence Project at ch 3 *14 (cited in note 134). 
 188 Id at ch 4 *1–2. 
 189 Id at ch 1 *1. 
 190 Id at ch 3 *10. 
 191 Ward, Way, and Wood, CFD Prevalence Project at ch 3 *11 (cited in note 134). 
 192 Id at ch 3 *15. 
 193 Id at ch 6 *1–4. 
 194 Id at ch 6 *4. 
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eradicate land contract abuses.”195 For the reasons explored in 
this Part, I reject that solution as too simplistic given the concerns 
currently permeating the modern housing market. Thus, 
Part IV.A begins by briefly exploring the myriad features of the 
US housing market, with a specific focus on comparing the low-
income rental and homeownership markets and their relation-
ships to wealth building. Having examined this, Parts IV.B 
and IV.C then examine two reasons that ILC reforms fail: 
(1) overprotection of the seller, and (2) behaviorally unsophisti-
cated reforms that fail to actually address problems on the 
ground. Part IV.B draws on Professor Matthew Desmond’s semi-
nal work in eviction to explore these housing markets as “extrac-
tive markets,”196 and notes how this nature of these markets 
clearly indicates why the current reforms are insufficient to coun-
teract the predatory nature of ILCs. Finally, Part IV.C explains 
two particular problems with the legislative reforms explained in 
Part III: (1) the documented failure of mandated disclosure, and 
(2) the failure of complex legal schemes to protect unsophisticated 
actors. This leads into Part V, where I propose three reforms 
which take into account these realities of the housing market and 
human behavior. 
A. The Illusory Dream: Homeownership and Its Alternatives 
Desmond points out that “[t]he distinctly American desire to 
own a home is just as pronounced among the poor as it is among 
the middle class.”197 The American Dream is now largely associ-
ated with homeownership as a symbol of success, sign of stability, 
and promise of generational wealth. In Desmond’s words, “Since 
the pioneer days, freedom and citizenship and landholding have 
advanced in lockstep in the American mind. To be American was 
to be a homeowner.”198 The widespread societal impulse to become 
a homeowner is so strong that people are willing to enter into 
risky contracts to achieve it. ILC sellers are happy to make that 
deal. What makes this desire to be a homeowner even more pro-
nounced is the widespread disdain for long-term tenancy. In 1820, 
Senator Thomas Hart argued that tenancy was “unfavorable to 
freedom” because “[i]t lays the foundation for separate orders in 
 
 195 Mancini and Saunders, 28 Communities & Bank at 11 (cited in note 130). 
 196 Matthew Desmond, Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City 305 (Broad-
way 2016). 
 197 Id at 349 n 3. 
 198 Id (emphasis added). 
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society, annihilates the love of country, and weakens the spirit of 
independence.”199 This Section seeks to challenge the American 
assumption that homeownership is unequivocally better than 
renting. Rather, I propose looking at the housing issue as a holis-
tic concern—to focus on how to ensure safe, habitable housing in 
the low-income housing market as a whole by creating effective 
regulations for both renters and hopeful homebuyers. 
Policies promoting homeownership as “an essential stepping-
stone to accumulating wealth”200 have recently started to receive 
well-deserved criticism. In January 2020, The Economist called 
homeownership “the West’s biggest economic-policy mistake.”201 
Among the criticisms is that such policies have “created gaping 
inequalities and inflamed both generational and geographical di-
vides.”202 Though those promoting homeownership argue that it 
encourages better citizenship and that it is a way for low-income 
people to build generational wealth,203 some studies suggest that 
any benefits from homeownership for low-income households are 
limited at best.204 
As noted in Part II, Black Americans were systemically shut 
out of the mortgage market by the Federal Housing Administra-
tion, while White Americans received federally backed loans. As 
historian Richard Rothstein has shown, the current wealth gap 
between White and Black Americans exists in part because of 
these policies.205 But in contrast to the strong belief that home-
ownership inherently leads to generational wealth, some scholars 
now posit that the primary advantage of homeownership is that 
it forces people to save money they would otherwise spend 
 
 199 Id. 
 200 Custard, Comment, 67 DePaul L Rev at 533 (cited in note 62). 
 201 The Horrible Housing Blunder: Home Ownership Is the West’s Biggest Economic-
Policy Mistake (The Economist, Jan 16, 2020), online at https://www.economist.com/leaders/ 
2020/01/16/home-ownership-is-the-wests-biggest-economic-policy-mistake (visited May 19, 
2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 See Anne B. Shlay, Low-Income Homeownership: American Dream or Delusion?, 
43 Urban Stud 511, 519 (2006); William N. Goetzmann and Matthew Spiegel, Policy Im-
plications of Portfolio Choice in Underserved Mortgage Markets, in Nicolas P. Retsinas and 
Eric S. Belsky, eds, Low-Income Homeownership: Examining the Unexamined Goal 257, 
272 (Brookings Institution 2002) (“In fact, encouraging homeownership among low-income 
families will only increase the wealth gap in the United States.”). 
 205 Rothstein, The Color of Law at 153 (cited in note 44) (“[W]e cannot understand the 
income and wealth gap that persists between African Americans and whites without ex-
amining governmental policies that purposely kept black incomes low throughout most of 
the twentieth century.”). 
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elsewhere.206 Moreover, although there is good evidence of corre-
lation between homeownership and positive social effects like sta-
bility, self-esteem, and participation in the community, these 
studies focus exclusively on high- and middle-income families.207 
There are fewer studies on low-income homeownership itself. 
Some studies have shown “limited although positive [social] ef-
fects.”208 These studies cast doubt on the argument that because 
homeownership has historically created generational wealth for 
White families, the government should implement policies that 
focus on increasing homeownership among low-income and mi-
nority communities. 
Homeownership’s limited benefits for low-income households 
indicate that Desmond’s concern that “[e]xploitation thrives when 
it comes to the essentials” is especially relevant in the ILC con-
text.209 Desmond argues: “If the poor pay more for their housing, 
food, durable goods, and credit, and if they get smaller returns on 
their educations and mortgages (if they get returns at all), then 
their incomes are even smaller than they appear. This is funda-
mentally unfair.”210 
The combination of the basic need for housing and a strong 
societal preference for homeownership makes the ILC particu-
larly exploitable by profit-seeking private actors. Thus, as ex-
plored in Part II.B, the ILC has been incredibly profitable for 
sellers. Given that the one comprehensive study of ILCs showed 
that, in one Texas county, 45 percent had been cancelled without 
leading to homeownership,211 this suggests that the return on 
ILCs for low-income buyers is very low and leads to an even 
greater risk of exploitation. 
Given this failure rate, the most important factor in determin-
ing whether traditional views of homeownership can justify the 
continued existence of the ILC in its current form is whether 
there are real economic benefits for low-income homeowners. 
 
 206 Eli Beracha, Alexandre Skiba, and Ken H. Johnson, A Revision of the American 
Dream of Homeownership, 26 J Housing Rsrch 1, 2–3 (2017) (“That is, even though renting 
can generate more wealth than buying, buying a home can result in more wealth because 
it forces households to save more than they would otherwise.”). 
 207 Shlay, 43 Urban Stud at 517–18 (cited in note 204). 
 208 Id at 519. 
 209 Desmond, Evicted at 306 (cited in note 196). 
 210 Id. 
 211 Ward, Way, and Wood, CFD Prevalence Project at ch 3 *13 (cited in note 134). 
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However, such economic benefits are ambiguous at best.212 Schol-
ars cannot say with certainty that homeownership is an effective 
or even beneficial way for low-income households to build assets 
and accumulate wealth. According to Professor Anne B. Shlay, 
“The question is whether homeownership is a good asset-building 
strategy for low-income families compared with renting. And the 
answer is, we do not know.”213 
Professors William N. Goetzmann and Matthew Spiegel are 
even more critical of policies that promote homeownership among 
low-income households. Their study concluded: “Overinvestment 
in housing by families with modest savings means underinvest-
ment in financial assets that will grow and provide income for 
retirement. In fact, encouraging homeownership among low-income 
families will only increase the wealth gap in the United States.”214 
Goetzmann and Spiegel argue that homeownership rates in un-
derserved areas will not change until the current tax code 
changes.215 Homeownership can be a valuable part of a diversified 
financial portfolio, but it is dangerous as a primary investment 
because of “low historical return[s] and a serious risk of loss over 
multiple-year horizons.”216 Thus, the economic benefits of low-in-
come homeownership should not be expected to outweigh the 
risks of predatory ILCs. 
This research indicates merely that policymakers should not 
consider homeownership an unequivocal good that can outweigh 
the many sins of exploitative contracts. This is perhaps the 
strongest argument for destroying the ILC as it currently exists 
and refusing to enforce them at all. But the ILC should not be 
considered in a vacuum. The ILC has returned to prominence be-
cause federal regulations of the mortgage market have made it 
that much harder for low-income households to become homeown-
ers. If regulators completely eradicate the ILC, the only alterna-
tive will be renting. If there were clear evidence that renting was 
better for low-income households, this would be the obvious solu-
tion. However, the rental market is rife with its own issues: evic-
tion courts are extremely busy and hearings are often pro 
 
 212 Shlay, 43 Urban Stud at 519 (cited in note 204) (“But, as noted by Nicolas Retsinas 
and Eric Belsky (2002a), there is not clear evidence that homeownership delivers economic 
gains to low-income households.”). 
 213 Shlay, 43 Urban Stud at 519 (cited in note 204). 
 214 Goetzmann and Spiegel, Policy Implications of Portfolio Choice at 272 (cited in 
note 204). 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. 
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forma;217 the law has much stronger protections for landlords than 
tenants;218 legal representation for tenants is limited at best;219 
and even where tenant protections have been written into the 
law, there is good evidence indicating that on the ground those 
protections do little to change the outcome of cases.220 
All this makes clear that there is unlikely to be a single, sim-
ple solution to protect low-income individuals from exploitation in 
housing markets. Instead, legislators, jurists, and scholars should 
think creatively about how to best combat the legacy of discrimi-
natory housing policies while simultaneously protecting current 
low-income households. ILCs can be part of this solution.221 Ap-
propriately regulated, the ILC may provide low-income popula-
tions with a number of benefits. It is a path to homeownership 
that grants them the control over their housing situation that 
they lack when renting. The ILC could provide the financial dis-
cipline that has been shown to be the one unequivocal advantage 
of owning over renting.222 Finally, allowing the ILC to continue to 
exist avoids entirely cutting low-income households out of the 
homeownership market. Given the uncertainty in how to best 
 
 217 See Desmond, Evicted at 94–107 (cited in note 196) (describing the experience of 
one day at the eviction court); N.R. Kleinfield, Where Brooklyn Tenants Plead the Case for 
Keeping Their Homes (NY Times, May 20, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/SM6A-74T2 
(“The steady stream of people trickling into this maze of courtrooms gives the impression 
that an entire small town is perpetually being cleared of its citizens. The pace of evictions 
has slowed recently . . . but it remains high.”). 
 218 Desmond, Evicted at 307 (cited in note 196) (“Large-scale historical and structural 
changes have given urban landlords the opportunity to make good money, sometimes spec-
tacular money, by providing housing to struggling families at a cost the law has deemed 
fair and just.”); Barker, et al, The Eviction Machine Churning Through New York City 
(cited in note 155) (exploring how housing court is leveraged by landlords to get around 
rent control laws and avoid repairing apartments). 
 219 Desmond, Evicted at 303 (cited in note 196) (“[I]n many housing courts around the 
country, 90 percent of landlords are represented by attorneys, and 90 percent of tenants 
are not.”). 
 220 See Summers, 87 U Chi L Rev at 181–205 (cited in note 13) (providing empirical 
data to indicate that the implied warranty of habitability has failed to meaningfully pro-
tect tenants by either ensuring they have higher quality housing or providing them a de-
fense in certain eviction cases). 
 221 For example, in the right circumstances, it is possible that ILCs lower the stakes 
of homeownership just enough to combat some of the most prevalent concerns in the hous-
ing market. Professor Lee Anne Fennell has suggested that ILCs may be a useful tool in 
combatting segregation and furthering fair housing goals. See Lee Anne Fennell, Search-
ing for Fair Housing, 97 BU L Rev 349, 417–18 (2017). 
 222 Beracha, Skiba, and Johnson, 26 J Housing Rsrch at 2–3 (cited in note 206) (“That 
is, even though renting can generate more wealth than buying, buying a home can result 
in more wealth because it forces households to save more than they would otherwise.”). 
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combat the myriad current housing market problems, it does not 
make sense to entirely eliminate the ILC as a tool. 
B. Winners and Losers: Poverty and Exploitation 
It is not just that homeownership has ambiguous benefits for 
low-income households that should caution legislatures about 
strong protections and rights for ILC sellers. Reforms fail for two 
reasons: (1) overprotection of sellers’ rights to ensure the ILC 
market continues to exist (explored in this Section), and (2) over-
reliance on behaviorally unsophisticated reforms which provide 
little-to-no actual protection to buyers on the ground (examined 
in Part IV.C). Desmond’s Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the Amer-
ican City posits that the low-income housing market is an “extrac-
tive market[ ].”223 That is, society does not recognize housing as “a 
basic right of all Americans.”224 Instead, our system privileges 
“the right to make as much money as possible by providing fami-
lies with housing—and especially to profit excessively from the 
less fortunate.”225 More simply, in our housing markets, “[t]here 
are losers because there are winners.”226 It is perhaps inevitable 
that in the distribution of rights, the law must unequally benefit 
some and burden others. Our current system privileges the rights 
of landlords and ILC sellers over the rights of those living in these 
homes and apartments—and to the extent that this continues to 
happen, poverty cannot be eradicated merely by increasing the 
incomes of those experiencing it.227 
Desmond’s discussion of extractive markets is instructive be-
cause it indicates what is at the core of the ILC debate: “There are 
two freedoms at odds with each other: the freedom to profit from 
[ILCs] and the freedom to live in a safe and affordable home.”228 
Historically, especially when it comes to minority communities, 
the United States has fiercely protected this freedom to profit. 
During the height of the ILC market in Chicago’s majority Black 
neighborhoods in the 1960s, a contract seller told the Saturday 
Evening Post: “If anybody who is well established in this business 
 
 223 Desmond, Evicted at 305 (cited in note 196). 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id (“Exploitation. Now, there’s a word that has been scrubbed out of the poverty 
debate.”). 
 227 Desmond, Evicted at 305 (cited in note 196) (“[P]overty is not just a product of low 
incomes.”). 
 228 Id at 308. Of course, Desmond is not speaking about ILCs here—but his point is 
easily transferrable from one part of the housing market to another. 
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in Chicago doesn’t earn $100,000 a year, . . . he is loafing.”229 But 
this history and the inequality it perpetuates indicates that per-
haps the law has so far failed to strike the right balance between 
these freedoms. 
The purpose of this discussion is to demonstrate why legisla-
tures, jurists, and scholars should not shy away from aggressive 
regulation. This Comment’s proposals work from the assumption 
that the scales could be tipped further in the direction of protect-
ing buyers without entirely removing the incentive to offer ILCs. 
To be exact, this Comment rejects the conventional wisdom that 
any actual restriction on the rights of ILC sellers—restricting the 
use of the forfeiture clause, requiring sellers to repair their own 
properties before sale, or reducing the interest rates that may be 
charged—will entirely destroy the ILC market. Instead, this 
Comment argues that, to the extent that ILC sellers will only of-
fer such contracts when they can make an exorbitantly high 
profit, the law should not protect their right to such profit over 
the right of buyers to seek stable housing. Thus, using this lens, 
the rest of this Part explores why the currently accepted reforms 
fail to strike an appropriate balance, before Part V proposes a se-
ries of stronger reforms. 
C. Behavioral Problems: Why Current Reforms Fail 
Current reforms fail for two primary reasons: (1) they fail to 
appropriately protect the interests of the buyer because they over-
protect the interests of the seller, and (2) they fail to appropri-
ately address how buyers and sellers actually interact in the mar-
ket. This Section explores two common criticisms that address 
this second point. Thus, here I briefly mention Professors Ben-
Shahar and Schneider’s critiques of mandatory disclosure, and 
explore more fully Desmond’s condemnation of complex legal 
schemes designed to protect legally unsophisticated consumers. 
1. No one reads the fine print anyway. 
As discussed in Part III.A, Ben-Shahar and Schneider have 
written extensively on the failure of mandatory disclosure as con-
sumer protection. As they write, “disclosures have been mandated 
with ardent hopes of liberating people from ignorance, freeing them 
to be autonomous, and equipping them to make well-considered 
 
 229 Coates, The Case for Reparations (cited in note 6) (quotation marks omitted). 
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decisions.”230 Yet, they have shown that mandatory disclosures 
rarely, if ever, meaningfully protect consumers. Specifically, “dis-
closees often do not read disclosed information, do not understand 
it when they read it, and do not use it even if they understand 
it.”231 Ultimately, they suggest “the repeal of all useless disclo-
sures, not just because they are pointless, but because they ag-
gravate the accumulation problem.”232 While Ben-Shahar and 
Schneider refuse to provide a one-size-fits-all solution to replace 
the regulatory scheme of mandatory disclosure, they do suggest a 
few paths to explore as regulators seek to replace failed manda-
tory disclosure regimes.233 The two recommendations they provide 
are to keep any disclosures/warnings “brief, simple, and easy”234 
and moving toward providing actual advice, rather than simply 
providing information.235 
This Comment responds to these criticisms of mandatory dis-
closure in the ILC market. In proposing my suggested alterna-
tives to current regulation in Part V, I draw on the efforts to com-
bat predatory loans in the mortgage context. Thus, some of the 
provisions in the statutes discussed in Part III that prohibit cer-
tain terms, such as prepayment penalties and unfair mandatory 
arbitration provisions, are a step in the right direction for actual 
regulation of the ILC. This Comment suggests that effective reg-
ulation must be stronger, even if it risks making the market for 
ILCs less palatable for sellers. If sellers are not interested in 
providing fair ILCs, then, given the high risk of exploitation, law-
makers should not protect their right to create these predatory 
financing tools. 
2. Remedies too complicated to understand and too time-
consuming to be effective. 
Desmond’s work on evictions has clearly shown that, often, 
the law as written and the law on the ground are very different—
 
 230 Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, Coping with the Failure of Mandated 
Disclosure, 11 Jerusalem Rev Legal Stud 83, 83 (2015). 
 231 Ben-Shahar and Schneider, 159 U Pa L Rev at 665 (cited in note 139). 
 232 Ben-Shahar and Schneider, 11 Jerusalem Rev Legal Stud at 93 (cited in note 230). 
 233 Ben-Shahar and Schneider, 159 U Pa L Rev at 742–49 (cited in note 139) (recom-
mending that reforms focus on providing simple information and focusing on advice over 
purely factual information). 
 234 Id at 743. 
 235 Id at 746 (“When we abandon the unreal world of mandated disclosure and ask 
how people really make decisions, we see that they generally seek—and that the market 
often supplies—not data, but advice.”). 
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and this consideration should animate all reforms that are passed 
to protect actors who are unlikely to have legal representation. 
Desmond has illustrated clearly that because of the differences in 
how landlord-tenant law is written and how it is enforced, the 
various protections provided by statutes and judicial decisions are 
nearly meaningless for most tenants.236 Professor Nicole Sum-
mers recently completed a survey of housing decisions in New 
York City which further reinforced this concern in regard to the 
implied warranty of habitability.237 Her survey suggested that 
without legal representation, the implied warranty of habitability 
provides essentially no protection.238 
This lesson from the rental market should instruct lawmakers 
as they seek to effectively regulate the ILC. Like renters, ILC buy-
ers are unlikely to have legal representation. Regulation there-
fore must and should be drafted with pro se buyers in mind. The 
lack of legal representation compounds the failure of mandatory 
disclosures in ILC legislation and suggests a reason why the com-
plex dispute resolution procedures created by the Texas statute 
have failed. Professors Peter M. Ward, Heather K. Way, and Lu-
cille Wood suggest in their study of the ILC in Texas that ILC 
buyers “face a number of exploitative practices through their par-
ticipation in a market that still lacks regulatory oversight and 
contains limited consumer protections.”239 They suggest that part 
of the failure of the Texas statute is that there is no agency re-
sponsible for enforcing its provisions, and thus there is a need for 
stronger oversight.240 This Comment proposes that lawmakers 
should consider these issues from the outset. 
 
 
 236 Desmond, Evicted at 304 (cited in note 196) (“Every housing court would need to 
be adequately funded so that it could function like a court, instead of an eviction assembly 
line: stamp, stamp, stamp.”) (emphasis in original). 
 237 Black’s Law Dictionary 773 (West 3d Pocket Ed 2006) (defining “implied warranty 
of habitability” as “[i]n a residential lease, a warranty from the landlord to the tenant that 
the leased property is fit to live in and that it will remain so during the term of the lease”). 
 238 Summers, 87 U Chi L Rev at 208–10 (cited in note 13). This evidence suggests that 
Professor Freyfogle’s suggestion to apply a three-part functional-equivalence test to deter-
mine if the implied warranty of habitability should apply to ILCs will also fail to mean-
ingfully protect buyers. If the implied warranty does not work in the eviction context, there 
is little reason to believe that it will be more effective if judges have to walk through a 
three-part test to determine if it should even apply. See Freyfogle, 62 NYU L Rev at 310–
19 (cited in note 13). 
 239 Ward, Way, and Wood, CFD Prevalence Project at ch 6 *1 (cited in note 134). 
 240 Id at ch 6 *11. 
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V.  STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN ELIMINATION AND 
EXPLOITATION 
This Comment accepts the prevailing argument that at least 
some ILCs are desirable as a path for low-income homeownership, 
provided that there are meaningful protections from the most 
predatory version of the ILC. In the eviction context, Professor 
Ezra Rosser notes that “if the process were less efficient, land-
lords might see eviction as more of a last resort.”241 Thus, this 
Comment considers ways to make the process of removing de-
faulting ILC buyers more difficult for ILC sellers. As the New 
York Times notes, “[t]he [ILC] home dweller has more limited pro-
tections than a person buying a house with a mortgage, and evic-
tions are quicker than a foreclosure.”242 This Comment suggests 
ways to slow down the forfeiture process to allow buyers time to 
fully advocate for their rights, and seeks to give judges more tools 
beyond judicially created protections to effectively protect these 
homebuyers.243 
This Part outlines the three reforms to ILC legislation that 
should be enacted. In Part V.A, I propose that, following 
HOEPA’s lead, states should institute mandatory purchase coun-
seling for ILC buyers. This would ensure that ILC buyers are able 
to understand the information that has been disclosed to them 
and that they are fully aware of the risks they are taking on. In 
Part V.B, I indicate that ILC cases should be treated more like 
mortgage cases and thus heard in the same court that hears mort-
gage cases, rather than in the court that hears eviction cases. The 
reason for this is twofold: (1) as a financing device, ILCs are more 
analogous to mortgages than rental agreements; and (2) it has be-
come increasingly clear that eviction courts are overwhelmed just 
in terms of hearing the number of eviction cases that come before 
them. This reform would lessen the pressure on such courtrooms 
and give ILC buyers a more effective hearing. Finally, in 
Part V.C, I argue that any ILC that includes both an “as is” deed 
and a forfeiture clause should be declared per se unconscionable 
and voidable by the buyer. This will guarantee either that sellers 
will have to ensure the houses they sell are in habitable condition 
 
 241 Ezra Rosser, Book Review, Exploiting the Poor: Housing, Markets, and Vulnera-
bility, 126 Yale L J F 458, 464 (2017). 
 242 Goldstein and Stevenson, Market for Fixer-Uppers (cited in note 116). 
 243 In the ILC context, judicial reform alone has failed to protect consumers. See Dan-
ielson, Note, 1986 U Ill L Rev at 101–09 (cited in note 32). 
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or they will have to enforce their rights through the state’s mort-
gage process. 
A. Mandatory Purchase Counseling 
The statutes surveyed in Part III generally seek to slow down 
the process of committing to an ILC by providing buyers with a 
mandatory cooling-off period. In theory, this period should allow 
buyers time to think about the full consequences of their decision 
and seek advice about their potential investment. In practice, it 
is unclear if these cooling-off periods are effective. Having entered 
into the contract, potential buyers may be more excited about the 
possibility of participating in the American Dream of homeown-
ership than worried about the costs if the investment falls 
through. 
Thus, this Comment proposes that states impose purchase 
counseling requirements on ILC transactions. This proposal is in-
spired by the HOEPA requirements that most loans secured by 
the borrower’s primary residence require the borrower to undergo 
pre-loan counseling.244 Preferably, a provision for this kind of 
counseling would require potential buyers to speak to a financial 
counselor about the risks and benefits of an ILC before entering 
into any agreement. Given the clear concerns about mandatory 
disclosure, it is unlikely that written disclosures about risks or 
information about best practices on a government website—a re-
form implemented by the Virginia act245—will effectively protect 
consumers. 
If states cannot mandate in-person counseling provisions, 
which are costly in both manpower and enforcement mechanisms, 
states should require sellers to provide a list of financial 
 
 244 For an explanation of HOEPA pre-loan counseling and its possible impacts on the 
mortgage market, see Christopher K. Seide, Consumer Financial Protection Post Dodd-
Frank: Solutions to Protect Consumers Against Wrongful Foreclosure Practices and Pred-
atory Subprime Auto Lending, 3 U Puerto Rico Bus L J 219, 240 (2012). 
 245 Va Code Ann § 55.1-3003. The “best practices” published by the Virginia Board of 
Housing and Community Development are one page and addressed to sellers, not buyers. 
Virginia Department of Housing and Community Development, Best Practices for Resi-
dential Executory Real Estate Contracts, archived at https://perma.cc/Q8SA-TMHN. A bet-
ter provision might look something like the mortgage information provided by the CFPB, 
which outlines legal protections for buyers. See generally, for example, Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau, Shopping for a Mortgage? What You Can Expect under Federal 
Rules (Jan 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/QCJ8-ZX82. Providing this kind of infor-
mation in clear, plain language that interested ILC buyers can access with a mere Google 
search is more likely to be helpful than a one-pager of best practices for sellers which has 
no legal effect. 
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counselors with whom potential ILC buyers can speak for little-
to-no cost. Such a provision would go alongside the current cooling-
off periods, giving buyers direction for places to go for advice re-
garding the financial decision that they are making. 
Moreover, since buyers typically use ILCs as a mortgage re-
placement, it makes sense to present buyers with similar protec-
tions as those provided to mortgage holders. Given the concern 
surrounding high risk mortgages after the 2008 crisis, the CFPB 
has sought to ensure that more people receive advice before en-
tering into these loans. The ILC is not a loan per se, but it does 
function in similar ways. The risks to ILC buyers are more like 
the risks to mortgagors than the risks to tenants—the end goal is 
homeownership. Homeownership, at least in part, is a financial 
investment with clear risks that go beyond the risks associated 
with eviction. 
The cost of these counseling measures should be imposed on 
the seller, who is far more likely to be represented by counsel and 
more likely to be a sophisticated market actor. The post-Dodd-
Frank regulatory rules from the CFPB can provide guidance for 
how to draft these kinds of provisions. Dodd-Frank specifically 
requires lenders to “provide a list of homeownership counselors to 
applicants for federally related mortgage loans.”246 At the very 
least, states should consider passing provisions for homeowner-
ship counseling for potential ILC buyers that reflect the CFPB’s 
final rule codified at 12 CFR § 1024.20. If homeownership coun-
selors are not prepared to counsel ILC buyers, states should con-
sider providing trainings on ILCs, the unique risks they pose, and 
any state-specific protections. 
B. Enforcing Legal Protections: Venue and State Enforcement 
On its own, counseling will only protect buyers so far. In order 
to counteract the problems Desmond observed in eviction courts, 
explored in Part IV, I next propose that legislation should create 
venue provisions to provide more tangible protections for buyers 
than they can hope to receive in eviction court. When the Third 
Restatement of Property proposed treating the ILC as a mort-
gage, the writers argued that “[a] growing number of states hold 
 
 246 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, High-Cost Mortgage and Homeownership 
Counseling Amendments to the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z) and Homeownership 
Counseling Amendments to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed Reg 6856, 6863 (Jan 31, 2013), amending 12 CFR §§ 1024, 1026. 
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that the [ILC] should be treated as a mortgage, at least in those 
cases where the purchaser’s payments have been more than nom-
inal.”247 This was written in 1997, but so far, only Oklahoma has 
actually enacted this suggestion—and the state did so long before 
the Restatement was written. The Restatement provides multiple 
cites to specific cases where various state courts ostensibly cre-
ated an equity of redemption248 that applied to ILCs, essentially 
creating a mortgage. However, the current state of the ILC mar-
ket indicates such judicially created rules fail to protect consum-
ers across the board. My approach to the venue question indicates 
that, while simply eliding ILCs and mortgages as one and the 
same is probably too simplistic, courts that deal with mortgages 
are far more likely to be experienced in equitable principles and 
less likely to be overwhelmed by the sheer number of cases they 
see each year. 
Thus, this Comment proposes two changes to assist in the en-
forcement of ILC protections. First, this Comment argues that re-
gardless of the number or amount of payments the buyer had 
made, all ILC cases should be heard in the same courts that typ-
ically hear mortgage cases, rather than eviction cases. Evictions 
are efficient—perhaps fatally so—and ILCs are more complex 
than a typical lease in terms of the property interest they create. 
Thus, even when forfeiture is a viable remedy, legislatures should 
mandate that ILC sellers may not leverage the typical eviction 
process to remove buyers from the home. 
Instead, if a buyer defaults (and fails to cure under the state’s 
cure period), and the seller seeks to legally remove them from the 
home, the seller should be forced to bring the case in a mortgage 
court, not an eviction court. Judges who typically handle mort-
gage foreclosures are more prepared to navigate the various de-
fenses that a buyer may bring—either regarding the amount of 
payments already made or substantial repairs paid for by the 
buyer that may have resulted in default. To avoid the complica-
tions of the whole judicial foreclosure, lawmakers could choose to 
implement an alternative method of sale.249 
 
 247 Restatement (Third) of Property § 3.4 (1997). 
 248 Black’s Law Dictionary (West 11th ed 2019) (defining “equity of redemption” as 
“[t]he right of a mortgagor in default to recover property before a foreclosure sale by paying 
the principal, interest, and other costs that are due”). 
 249 Two possibilities already exist in the law. The first is “strict foreclosure”:  
A rare procedure that gives the mortgagee title to the mortgaged property—
without first conducting a sale—after a defaulting mortgagor fails to pay the 
mortgage debt within a court-specified period. The use of strict foreclosure is 
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Second, ILC statutes should include a provision allowing at-
torneys general to bring suit against any ILC vendor they find to 
be regularly providing predatory ILCs contrary to state law. This 
will help bridge the gap Professors Ward, Way, and Wood ob-
served in Texas regarding the law on the books and the law in 
practice.250 They noted that in spite of strong protections estab-
lished in Texas law, designed specifically to protect residents in 
colonias, the law on the ground has failed to meaningfully protect 
buyers in part because they lack information about their legal 
rights.251 The ability for attorneys general to bring suits against 
ILC sellers would mean that even if buyers lacked meaningful 
opportunities or the information to protect their interests, a third-
party state actor could step in and ensure the law was followed. 
This will create a path for enforcement that does not rely on pri-
vate, pro se litigants to be aware of their rights. 
Lawmakers must ensure that ILC forfeiture cases are not 
heard in the same courts that typically hear eviction proceedings. 
They must also create state causes of action such that the attor-
ney general’s office can seek to enforce the statute if/when case-
by-case adjudication fails. The goal of such provisions would be to 
ensure that each ILC case is not treated as a typical eviction sce-
nario and to give states the power to enforce their laws against 
particularly large companies. Such provisions may be especially 
useful given that the contemporary market is dominated by a 
handful of large companies.252 An alternative to these kinds of pro-
visions would be for attorneys general to bring Fair Housing Act 
disparate impact claims253 against large ILC vendors whose ILCs 
disproportionately impact minority communities. This may be an 
effective way for attorneys general to seek to protect consumers 
in the absence of regulation by legislators, but to meaningfully 
 
limited to special situations, except in those few states that permit this remedy 
generally.  
Black’s Law Dictionary (West 11th ed 2019). The second has been enacted by Texas, which 
has created a relatively complex legal scheme for the enforcement of rights under ILCs 
after the first thirty days. This approach is surveyed in Part III.D. 
 250 Ward, Way, and Wood, CFD Prevalence Project at ch 6 *11 (cited in note 134). 
 251 Id at ch 6 *3. 
 252 Goldstein and Stevenson, Market for Fixer-Uppers (cited in note 116) (“Harbour, 
which raised more than $60 million from wealthy investors, was the single largest buyer 
of foreclosed homes from Fannie Mae’s bulk sale program from 2010 to 2014, which the 
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 253 See Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v Inclusive Communi-
ties Project, Inc, 135 S Ct 2507, 2516–18 (2015). 
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change the practices of ILC vendors, statewide or, ideally, nation-
wide regulation is necessary. 
C. Eliminating the Combination of “As Is” Deed and the 
Forfeiture Clause 
Finally, and most importantly, lawmakers should create stat-
utory provisions making per se unconscionable any contract for 
real property that combines an “as is” deed and a forfeiture 
clause. Failing that, any contract that includes both should be 
treated as a mortgage, subject to all mortgage protections. This 
will create a strong defense against what is arguably the biggest 
flaw in the ILC system: that it allows sellers to market substand-
ard housing and profit from any repairs the buyer makes. But this 
proposal stops short of entirely eliminating the ILC: where buyers 
continue to be protected by the duty to disclose defects,254 forfei-
ture clauses remain in force. This solution strikes a balance be-
tween accepting that sellers will need incentives to enter into 
riskier loans while also seeking to improve protections for low-
income buyers. This solution forces sellers to choose between two 
of the most concerning aspects of the ILC, thus either encourag-
ing sellers to ensure the homes they sell are habitable or ensuring 
that buyers will have greater protections if they are forced to 
spend lots of money on repairs and subsequently default on their 
payments. 
Further, lawmakers should consider creating a warranty of 
quality255 specifically for ILCs. Such a warranty would be similar 
to the implied warranty of habitability, but would apply to ILCs 
specifically. This would go further than simply prohibiting ILCs 
to be sold under “as is” deeds, but rather would impose an affirm-
ative duty on sellers to ensure that the homes they offer are hab-
itable and safe for potential buyers. Generally, warranties of 
quality have been implied for consumer goods but not for real 
property. This Comment proposes changing that, at least for real 
property sold under an ILC. This would protect buyers from pro-
hibitive repair costs of which they may be unaware when they 
enter into the initial contract. 
 
 254 For an example of an affirmative duty to disclose, see Johnson v Davis, 480 S2d 
625, 629 (Fla 1985). 
 255 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “implied warranty of merchantability” as “[a] mer-
chant seller’s warranty—implied by law—that the thing sold is fit for its ordinary pur-
poses.” Black’s Law Dictionary (West 11th ed 2019). 
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Defenders of the ILC typically argue that without the forfei-
ture clause, sellers will refuse to offer ILCs.256 If this is the case, 
and forfeiture is essential for the continued existence of ILCs, 
legislatures should seek to create ILCs that are tolerable in other 
ways. This Comment focuses on the substandard nature of many 
of the homes sold via ILC, and suggests that if legislatures want 
to preserve forfeiture, they should not preserve forfeiture along-
side “as is” deeds. It is the combination of these provisions that 
make the ILC particularly dangerous to buyers, because they may 
be unaware of the repair costs associated with the house they are 
purchasing. Since the forfeiture remedy prevents ILC buyers 
from building equity in the home as they make repairs, there is a 
powerful argument that ILC buyers should have stronger protec-
tions than mortgagors in terms of covenants of habitability and 
warranties of quality. 
The goal of such a provision holding certain ILCs unconscion-
able or treating them as a mortgage would be to reduce the ex-
ploitative potential of the ILC market. If the forfeiture clause is 
as beneficial to sellers as scholars have argued, there is little rea-
son to think that sellers need the additional incentive of a right 
to disclaim any obligation to ensure that the homes they sell are 
habitable. As noted in Part II.C, the housing defects in these 
homes can be quite severe. 
To the extent that the ILC acts as a profit machine for ven-
dors, lawmakers need not protect the existence of contracts filled 
with multiple predatory terms. They should certainly not do so 
under the guise of promoting low-income homeownership as a 
means of wealth accumulation. The history of ILCs shows that it 
has been a tool to drain wealth from minority communities to the 
advantage of ILC sellers, as the North Lawndale contracts effec-
tively illustrated. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment proposes a fundamental shift in how lawmak-
ers view ILCs. When making laws regarding regulation of ILCs, 
lawmakers should consider strong buyer protections like those 
created by the Dodd-Frank Act and the CFPB in the wake of the 
subprime mortgage crisis. Unlike the current statutory schemes, 
 
 256 “Many have argued that abolition of the forfeiture remedy would end the use of 
the installment land contract as a financing device.” Moringiello, 100 Dickinson L Rev at 
741 & n 31 (cited in note 41) (collecting sources). 
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lawmakers should cease relying on mandatory disclosures and 
complex legal schemes that require legal counsel to fully protect 
buyers. Lawmakers should consider every provision from the per-
spective of the low-income buyers most likely to enter into ILCs, 
and should not hesitate to create powerful protections that limit 
the number of disadvantageous provisions a seller may include in 
a standard ILC. 
This Comment focuses on the forfeiture clause, “as is” deeds, 
and enforcement mechanisms. It suggests a path for maintaining 
the forfeiture clause, while combatting the detrimental combina-
tion of being forced to spend money on substantial repairs and 
failing to build equity in the home. Considering the ILC as a 
whole, there are compelling arguments for stronger habitability 
protections, venue changes, and the complete elimination of cer-
tain especially predatory ILCs. Habitability protections would en-
sure that if ILC buyers still choose to enter into riskier contracts, 
their chosen home would be—at the very least—in compliance 
with housing codes. Lawmakers, judges, and scholars should not 
continue to support the ILC and all its potentially predatory pro-
visions. To the extent that sellers are only interested in offering 
ILCs if the law allows them predatory terms—“as is” clauses jus-
tifying substandard housing, uniquely high interest rates, and 
forfeiture clauses which deny the ability to build equity—the ILC 
should not continue to exist. 
However, modified ILCs could be a beneficial tool to provide 
low-income households with access to affordable, habitable hous-
ing. Thus, this Comment proposes three reforms for ILC legisla-
tion that take into account the realities of the low-income housing 
market. First, following the HOEPA example, legislatures should 
mandate that all ILC purchasers have access to pre-purchase 
counseling. Second, legislatures should ensure that ILC disputes 
are heard in the courts that deal with mortgages, not the courts 
that deal with evictions. Third, and most important, ILCs that 
include both a forfeiture clause and an “as is” deed must be 
deemed per se unconscionable to ensure buyers receive adequate 
protection from predatory sellers. As it stands now, the ILC exists 
as a uniquely exploitative tool for sellers. Lawmakers should 
not—and the research indicates they cannot—rely on vague de-
fenses of homeownership in the abstract to defend its continued 
use. 
